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CHILE'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND THE HIDROAYSEN
NORTHERN PATAGONIA DAMS MEGAPROJECT: How Is THIS
PROJECT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?
MARCUS T. PEARSON*
DAVID ARONOFSKY**
EMILY ROYER***

Chile has taken important steps toward creating a more
Abstract:
comprehensive environmental regulatory system. Beginning in the early 1990s,
Chile's aggressive approach in creating Latin America's strongest free market
economy and negotiating free trade agreements stimulated national legislators to
improve the country's environmental laws and regulations, as well as its
enforcement capabilities.
Chile's most recent development achievementaccession to full member status in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") -culminated in the formation of both a cabinet-level
Ministry of the Environment with a potentially robust enforcement and oversight
branch within that Ministry. This Article assesses Ley 20.417, and Chile's legal
precedent regarding environmental decisions, through the lens of the proposed
HidroAysdn project to construct a series of hydroelectric dams in Chile's northern
Patagonia Aysdn region. This project, easily the country's most controversial
environmentally-related project to date, has generated both national and global
attention. This Article concludes that the HidroAysdn project does not qualify as
sustainable development under Ley 20.417, despite the Chilean Supreme Court's
decision approving the power-generating portion of the project; no legal action has
occurred to date on the transmission part of the project. However, even if the
project ultimately is considered sustainable development from a technical
standpoint, the court of public opinion has resoundingly rejected it.

* Marcus T. Pearson received his J.D. from the University of Washington School of Law in 2012 and
now practices at Plauch6 and Carr, an environmental and natural resources law firm in Seattle,
Washington. His contributions to this article stem from a paper produced in part for Professor
Aronofsky's January 2011 University of Montana Chile course, which included significant field
investigations in Chile's northern Patagonia Aysin region.
** David Aronofsky is Vice President of the Texas International Education Consortium (TIEC) in
Austin, Texas. At the time he co-wrote this article he had recently retired as General Counsel at The
University of Montana, where he was also an adjunct faculty member in the School of Law. He
regularly taught multidisciplinary environmental and trade policy courses in Chile, including Chile's
Ays6n region, since January 2003. He prepared his portion of this article primarily based on his Fall
2012 Sutton Colloquium HidroAysen project presentation.
*** Emily Royer completed her J.D. degree in May 2013. She prepared her part of this article primarily
from her work done with Professor Aronofsky's Fall 2012 Sutton Colloquium program. She is currently
an associate attorney in the Crowley Fleck law firm Billings, Montana office.
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INTRODUCTION

"The problem isn't that HidroAysin doesn't have the right to ask the
government for a dam permit. The problem is that the government has failed to
protect my family, protect our region, uphold its promises, and meaningfully
challenge HidroAysdn's project."
- Elizabeth "Lilli" Shindele, Estancia Los Nadis, January 14, 2011.'
Here, on a remote estancia (ranch) in the region of Ays6n, 1,000 miles south
of Santiago in a glacial valley tucked between two of the world's largest ice fields,
lies the epicenter of a struggle that has captured national and international
attention. Lilli and her husband Rozendo, have refused to accept a buyout from
HidroAysdn, the local subsidiary of a multinational joint energy venture composed
of ENDESA, a Spanish-Italian company, and Colbhn, S.A., its Chilean
counterpart. 2 They are one of two families in the area who will not move to make
way for a large-scale hydroelectric project that would provide power to the
population centers and the mining sector in central and northern Chile by damming
the Baker and Pascua Rivers and flooding almost 15,000 acres of private and
national park lands in Chilean Patagonia, an area known for its rugged beauty.3
The project's associated transmission line, which is integral to the project, would
create a 1,500 mile clear-cut area from Aysdn to Santiago, passing through three
national parks, numerous national reserves, and thousands of private landholdings
in a seismic landscape dotted with volcanoes and punctuated by the world's largest
earthquakes.4
Public opinion remains fiercely divided, although opinion polls indicate
seventy-four percent of the Chilean population opposes the project.
Environmental organizations unsuccessfully challenged the approval of the project
in court, and on April 4, 2012, the Chilean Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
ruling that approved the generation portion of the project.6 Interestingly, a Chilean
congressional committee found, in January 2012, that various government agencies

1. Interview with Elizabeth Shindele and Rozendo Sanchez, Estancia Los Iladis, in Aysdn, Chile
(Jan. 14, 2011).
2. Id. See also Michael Warren & Eva Vergara, Chile Approves HidroAysen Dam Project in Wild
Patagonia Despite Major Opposition, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 2011, 8:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/1 0/chile-hidroaysen-dam-project-approvedpatagonia-n 859833.html.
3. Chile Court Rules in Favour of PatagoniaHidroAysen Dam, BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2012, 5:55
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17620307 [hereinafter Chile Court Rules in
Favour].
6

4. See MAURICIO FIERRO, REPRESAS Y TERREMOTOS: EFECTOS EN LAS CUENCAS PATAG6NICAS
(2009), available at http://patagoniasenzadighe.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Represas-y-

Terremoto-en-la-Patagonia.pdf.
5. Maureen Cosgrove, Chile Court Orders Temporary Suspension ofHydroelectric Dam Project,
JURIST (June 21, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/chile-court-orders-temporarysuspension-of-hydroelectric-dam-project.php.
6. Chile CourtRules in Favour,supra note 3.
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might have contributed to "serious irregularities" in the approval process for
HidroAysdn's permit.7 Factual errors and questionable science were purportedly
included in the project's initial Environmental Impact Assessment, approved in
May 2011.8 Despite these alleged irregularities, the Chilean Supreme Court's
approval cleared the final hurdle in the way of the generation portion of the project.
Whether Chilean judicial approval would have resulted under Chile's recently
enacted environmental laws and regulations is addressed in detail below.
This project exposed weaknesses in Chile's 1994 Environmental Framework
Law (Ley Sobre Bases Generales del Medio Ambiente, or "LSBMA"). The
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") criticized
Chile's environmental laws and regulatory institutions as falling below the
standard required for OECD membership and advised Chile to improve those laws
and institutions before seeking full membership. 9 To increase the country's
chances of gaining such membership, Chile redesigned LSBMA to ensure that the
country's environmental institutions meet OECD's high standards.10
This article seeks to assess relevant portions of Chile's revamped
environmental law-known as Ley 20.417"-the agencies it creates and
empowers, and its scope of power. The proposed HidroAys6n project provides a
reference point to compare Ley 20.417 to LSBMA. Specifically, the article
explores whether Chile's revamped environmental regulatory framework
significantly alters the status quo by improving the prior law. Ultimately, this
article argues that Ley 20.417 represents a step forward for Chile. Combined with
the benefits and requirements that accompany OECD membership, Ley 20.417
strongly incentivizes Chile to make a more searching review of future large-scale
Because Chile updated its environmental
projects similar to HidroAys6n.
framework law in 2010 (after the project was proposed), courts reviewed legal
challenges to HidroAysdn's permit under the less stringent measures of the
LSBMA;1 2 thus, the project provides a solid reference point to compare Ley 20.417

7. Comisidn concluye que hubo "serias irregularidades" en evaluacion de HidroAysin, EMOL
PM),
7:01
2012,
18,
(Jan.
(Chile)
http://www.emol.com/noticias/economia/2012/01/18/522253/comision-concluye-que-hubo-seriasirregularidades-en-evaluacion-de-hidroaysen.html.
8. Amanda Maxwell, Appeals Court Rules in Favor of HidroAysin-And Sends Our Case to
2011),
12,
(Oct.
COUNCIL
DEF.
RESOURCEs
NAT.
Court,
Supreme
Chile's
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amaxwell/appeals court rulesin favor o.html.
9. ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: CHILE

15-16 (2005) [hereinafter OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW].
10. See Raul F. Campusano, La OCDE, Chile y el Medio Ambiente, UNIVERSIDAD DEL
DESARROLLO (Chile), http://www.udd.cl/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Microsoft-PowerPoint-UDDOECD-RCD-v3-Modo-de-compatibilidad.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (notes on file with author).
11. This Comment will refer to Ley 20.417 as alternately the Ley or Ley 20.417. This is not to be
confused with Chile's pre-existing Environmental Framework Law, discussed infra and identified as
LSBMA, which is the Spanish-language acronym for the law's title.
12. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [Courts of Appeals], 6 Octubre 2011, "Kiss, Antonio Horvath
c. Comisi6n de Evaluaci6n Ambiental de la Region de Aysin," Rol de la causa: 153-2011, protecci6n,
p. 127 (Chile), available at http://corte.podejudicial.cl/SITCORTEPORWEB (choose "C.A. de Puerto
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with its predecessor. Questions to keep in mind regarding this comparison are:
whether the newly overhauled system accounts for social and ecological costs, as
well as economic benefits; and, more importantly, whether the new system will
involve the necessary agencies and interest groups to ensure that proposed projects
impacting the environment receive an objective, holistic, and searching review.
Because of Chile's unique legal and political history, Part II provides the
reader with Chile's pertinent legal framework, particularly its unique free-market
legal tools, before describing the HidroAysin project. Part III describes and
critiques Chile's previous environmental institutions and explains how
international trade considerations have strongly influenced Chile's environmental
regulatory development.
Part IV discusses Ley 20.417, analyzes what it
accomplishes, and analyzes the Chilean Appellate Court and Supreme Court
decisions upholding the HidroAysdn project's approval under LSBMA. Part IV
concludes that the Chilean Courts would have likely reached a different outcome
had they applied Ley 20.417's standards to the HidroAys6n project.
II.

CHILE'S ENVIRONMENT REGULATIONS: A PRODUCT OF ITS FREE MARKET
DEVELOPMENT

Chile's unique free-market structure has shaped its legal development and
fostered strong economic growth and trade relationships, but has often pitted
economic development against environmental protection.' 3 This part of the article
first provides a short legal history of the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (19731990), primarily to show the way free market reform influenced how Chile
developed its environmental, energy, and water laws. It then describes the
proposed HidroAysdn hydroelectric dam, explaining that the project has provoked
strong sentiment because it pits the country's economic wellbeing and energy
security against the socio-environmental health of Chilean Patagonia.
A.

Pinochet'sFree Market Reforms

Pinochet's free market reforms have permitted Chile to develop economically
at the expense of Chile's environmental laws and regulatory institutions. The
various ways this has occurred are discussed below.
1.

The Dictatorship's Free-Market Reform Came at the Expense of
Government Oversight

On September 11, 1973, Chile's armed forces stormed the Presidential Palace
in Santiago and forcibly ousted the democratically elected President, Salvador

Montt" from the "Corte de Origen" box and choose "Protecci6n" from the "Recurso" box; input "1532011" into the text box and press "Consulta"; click on "Protecci6n-153-2011 " hyperlink to access
docket) [hereinafter Apelaciones, Kiss, Antonio Horvath c. Comisi6n de Evaluacidn Ambiental de la
Region de Aysen].
13. See James M. Cypher, Is Chile a Neoliberal Success?, DOLLARS & SENSE,
http://dollarsandsense.org/archives/2004/0904cypher.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
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Allende.14 General Augusto Pinochet took power and ruled over Chile for
seventeen years.' 5 Two stories emerged from the Pinochet era: one of human
rights abuses that claimed more than 3,000 lives and quashed free speech; and one
of spectacular economic growth through free-market policies designed to transform
the country's economic and legal institutions.' 6 This subsection focuses on the
second story of Pinochet's military dictatorship, as other authors have adequately
chronicled Pinochet's human rights violations.' 7
Under Pinochet, Chile's legal system codified radical (at least for Latin
America) free-market policies, first introduced to Chile by a cadre of economic
scholars from the University of Chicago led by Milton Friedman.' 8 The so-called
"Chicago Boys" promoted laissez-faire economics and scorned state intervention
in economic development.' 9 The Chicago Boys' influence over Pinochet's policies
culminated in 1980 with a new Chilean Constitution that institutionalized the freemarket economic model.2 0
Pinochet remains a highly polarizing figure in Chile, partly because of the
uneasy truce that ended his seventeen-year rule. 2 ' In 1988 he called for a
plebiscite, as mandated by the Constitution that Pinochet's government had written
in 1980, to submit his name as an official candidate for President.22 He lost, with
fifty-five percent voting for him to step down. 23 The negotiations following the
plebiscite ensured that Pinochet would avoid prosecution for his human rights
violations and would receive a lifetime seat in the Chilean Senate. 24

14. U.S.

Relations

with

Chile,

DEP'T

OF

STATE

(June

29,

2012),

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1981.htm.
15. Jonathan Kandell, Augusto Pinochet, Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies at 91, N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
11,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/1 I/world/americas/1 I pinochet.html?pagewanted=all.
16. Id.
17. Numerous human rights and legal scholars have opined on Pinochet's human rights abuses.
See, e.g., NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2005) (analyzing the impact of long-arm jurisdiction on international human rights
laws exercised against Pinochet); LUis RONIGER & MARIO SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND URUGUAY (1999) (comparing how
three countries responded to former dictators' human rights violations after redemocratization in the
1980s and 1990s); David Pion-Berlin, To Prosecuteor to Pardon?Human Rights Decisions in the Latin
American Southern Cone, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 105 (1994) (discussing why Chile did not prosecute
Pinochet and others for human rights abuses).
18. See generally JUAN GABRIEL VALDES, PINOCHET'S ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN
CHILE 127-200 (1995) (discussing University of Chicago economists' influence in Chile).
19. Id. See also CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR
INTERNATIONAL REFORM 35-36 (2004) [hereinafter BAUER, SIREN SONG].
20. BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 19, at 36.
21. Ricardo Lagos et al., The PinochetDilemma, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1999, at 26, 31-32.
22. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPiBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 26-28.
23. Lagos et al., supra note 21, at 3 1. See also conversation with Professor Tomds Vial Solar,
Program Director of Public Law, Universidad Andres Bello, Santiago, Chile (Jan. 4, 2011) (on file with
Marcus Pearson).
24. Lagos et al., supranote 21, at 31.
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Most importantly, however, Pinochet's legal legacy still impacts the everyday
lives of Chileans, as the Constitution and numerous legal codes enacted during his
regime remain in effect. 25 In addition, his free-market reforms encouraged
substantial market diversification and attracted foreign investment during and after
the dictatorship. 26 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the country drew comparisons
to South Asia's emerging economic powerhouses. 27 In particular, his free-market
legal reforms greatly affected Chile's water and energy development regime and
continue to impact the country's environmental regulatory system. 28
2.

Chile's Free-Market Model Promotes Large-Scale Hydroelectic
Development with Minimual Governmental Oversight

This subsection will analyze how Chile's 1981 Water Code, which privatized
water rights, and the 1980 Constitution work in conjunction to give constitutional
protection to water rights holders. 29 It suggests that the free-market legal model
ultimately permitted large-scale hydroelectric development to occur without proper
oversight from Chile's environmental institutions.
The 1980 Chilean Constitution declares that "[t]he rights of private citizens
over waters, recognized or constituted in conformity with the law, shall grant
proprietorship to the owners thereof." 30 Private citizens' proprietorship over water
demonstrates that the dictatorship intended to insert free-market ideals into the
realm of water rights.3 1 Much like other aspects of property ownership in Chile,
water becomes subject to market forces as soon as the state transfers that right to
an individual landowner.32 In practice, the Constitution subjects water rights to
real estate law,33 and has generally deferred to the court system instead of
imposing an administrative legal framework on adjudication and user disputes.34
Since 1980, because the Constitution grants such strong protections to water rights
holders, the Chilean government has exercised very limited administrative control

25. Id. at 32.
26. Sheila Amin Guti6rrez de Pifieres & Michael Ferrantino, Export Diversificationand Structural
Dynamics in the Growth Process: The Case of Chile, 52 J. DEv. EcON. 375, 389 (1997).
27. Mario Sznajder, Dilemmas of Economic and PoliticalModernization in Chile: A Jaguarthat
Wants to Become a Puma, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 725, 725 (1996) (discussing the similarities between
Chile, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, the "East Asian Tigers," suggesting that Chile should
democratize the remnants of Pinochet's military regime to complete its transformation).
28. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 19, at 35-36; Joe Mentor Jr., Trading Water, Trading
Places: Water Marketing in Chile and the Western United States 3-4 (Aug. 6-8, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript from AWRA/IWLRI-Univ. Dundee
Int'l Specialty Conference), available
at http://www.awra.org/proceedings/dundee01/Documents/Mentor.pdf.
29. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19(24). See also Mentor Jr.,
supra note 28, at 3.
30. CONSTITUci6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19(24).
31. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 19, at 35-36.
32. Id. at 47-50.
33. See Mentor Jr., supranote 28, at 3-4.
34. BAUER, SIREN SONG, supranote 19, at 35-36.
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over disputes.35 Additionally, the Constitution weaves tight restrictions around
administrative agencies minimizing their impact and ability to regulate water
issues.
In addition to the limitations imposed under the 1980 Constitution, the 1981
Water Code had long-term impacts on Chile's landscape because it: (1)
transformed water into a private commodity; and (2) invented a new type of water
right to take advantage of the country's potential hydroelectric resources. 7 First,
the 1981 Water Code rebranded water as a private resource subject to market
forces, and freed water rights from meaningful administrative oversight, in
accordance with the Chilean Constitution's generous definition of private
property. The Water Code declares water rights a "public property ... to which
39
the national government may grant private parties exclusive rights to use."
In practice, water rights applicants have broad leverage to determine whether,
and where to use those rights.40 For example, water rights applicants "do not have
to specify or justify their intended water uses to [the Government Water Agency],
and the agency is required to grant new rights free of charge if there is water
physically available" in a given basin. 41 They also do not have to justify their
intended use to the government.42 Even more importantly, once someone owns a
water right, the government has virtually no authority to track or regulate these
privately held rights. 43 In other words, the private market, rather than government
oversight, drives water appropriation and use. As a result, a robust and
controversial water speculation market exists in Chile because it permits wealthy
landholders and water speculators to amass substantial water rights.44
Chile's Water Code created a new type of water right from whole cloth-the
non-consumptive right. 4 5 The government invented this concept in order to open
up rivers to hydroelectric development, while attempting to sidestep a potential
conflict with irrigators who had already appropriated most of the nation's water for
consumptive use. 46 The non-consumptive right is typically allocated upstream,
before being reintroduced to the watershed at a point further downstream. 47 Article
14 of the Water Code implies that it prioritizes consumptive use-agriculture and
municipal use, for example-over non-consumptive use. 48 However, in practice,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Carl J. Bauer, Dams and Markets: Rivers and Electric Power in Chile, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J.
583, 596, 601 (2009) [hereinafter Bauer, Dams and Markets].
38. Id. at 599.
39. Id. at 598.
40. Id. at 598-99.
41. Id.
42. See Mentor Jr., supra note 28, at 4.
43. Id.
44. Bauer, Dams and Markets, supra note 37, at 599, 602.
45. Id. at 601.
46. Id.
47. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 19, at 103.
48. Article 14 of the Water Code defines non-consumptive rights, and then states that the
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the Water Code lacks clarity and has led to conflicts over who controls the
resource. 49
The Water Code's failure to establish a clear priority system between the two
types of rights has allowed large hydroelectric power interests to assert their
control over river basins. For example, a Chilean study found that "in times of
drought and for the sake of national electricity supplies, the Public Works Ministry
has managed several reservoirs that it controls to benefit hydropower over
irrigation."5 0 Carl Bauer, Chile's pre-eminent water law scholar, opines that in
addition to doubly allocating each river basin,5 non-consumptive rights stimulated
monopolistic water rights holdings and fueled water speculation by creating an
entirely new economic market with a highly restrictive resource.52 Because Chile
did not clearly establish consumptive rights as the higher-value resource, it
arguably supplanted traditional consumptive practices with more lucrative nonconsumptive practices that promised a higher rate of return on commercializing the
country's water resources.
B.

The HirdoAysin Project Has Failedto Alleviate Chile's Energy
Converns and Threatens to FurtherPoliticallyAlienate the Aysin
Region

The HidroAys6n project has emerged as the most recent iteration of Chile's
decades-long experiment with hydroelectric power. 53 This section first provides a
background on Chile's reliance on hydroelectric power and then develops the
socio-political framework within which the HidroAys6n project and its subsequent
conflict developed.
1.

Chile's Heavy Reliance on Hydroelectric Power at the Expense of
Developing Other Renewable Energy Sources

Chile's National Electricity Company (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad,
S.A., or "ENDESA") was formed in 1943 as a state-owned electricity company. 54
As part of Pinochet's free-market plan, the country privatized ENDESA in 1989.

withdrawal or return flow of waters shall not damage a third party's rights to the same waters. C6DIGO
DE AGUAS (Water Code), C6D. AGUAS art. 14.
49. Bauer, Dams and Markets, supra note 37, at 602-03.
50. Id. at 603 (citing Manuel Prieto, El Modelo Chileno de Gesti6n Hidroel6ctrica: Una
Approximaci6n desde la Sustenabilidad Profunda (Chile) (Nov. 2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Pontifica Universidad Cat6lica de Chile) (on file with Lo Condator Library, Pontifica Universidad
Cat6lica de Chile)).
51. According to Bauer, the government may fully allocate each watershed not only for
consumptive use, but may also allocate that same water for non-consumptive use. See id. at 602.
52. See id. at 601-02.
53. For a comprehensive background of hydroelectric power in Chile, see id. at 610-26.
54. About
Us:
History,
ENDESA
CHILE,
http://www.endesa.clEndesaChile/action.asp?id-00140&lang-en (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
55. Id. See also Bauer, Dams and Markets, supranote 37, at 624-25.
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The now-private company retained all the assets it had accumulated over its fortyfive year lifespan as Chile's national energy company, including all the company's
existing hydroelectric dams, the water rights pertaining to those dams, and nonconsumptive rights to all the potential dam sites that the company had yet to
develop.5 6 Today, ENDESA-Chile is a wholly owned subsidiary of ENDESAENDESA controls the
Spain, one of Europe's largest energy producers.
HidroAys6n project and hopes to use the project to contribute significantly to the
country's power grid.
Chile relies heavily on hydroelectric power generation to fuel its economic
engine, but energy demand has begun to outstrip supply. 60 The Chilean
Government estimates that it needs to double its energy capacity in the next decade
in order to keep up with a more affluent population's needs. 61 "In 2002, Chile met
[seventy-one] percent of its domestic energy needs with hydropower." 62 However,
recent droughts have forced the country to scramble to diversify its energy
production because many of its reservoirs are running well below capacity. 63
Hydroelectric companies have fully utilized the generation potential of the
country's northern and central rivers, and have now turned to the country's
southern rivers.6 ENDESA argues that the HidroAys6n project will solve the
country's energy problem by regulating energy flow and increasing the capacity of
the country's largest power grid, the Sistema InterconectadoCentral (Central Grid,
or "SIC").65 The dam's opponents respond that such a remote and costly dam

56. Bauer, Dams and Markets, supranote 37, at 625, 629.
57. In 2008, ENDESA-Spain was purchased by Italian energy giant Enel. David Lawsky &

William Schomberg, EU Clears Enel-Acciona Bidfor Endesa, REUTERS (June 16, 2008, 11:28 AM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/06/16/us-eu-endesa-takeover-idUKLl64379920080616.
58. Enel is Europe's third largest energy company. Stephen Jewkes, UPDATE 4-Enel Eyeing
Capital Hike as Option, Shares Drop, REUTERS
(Feb.
27,
2009, 9:36 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/27/enel-capitalincrease-idUSLR48905320090227.
ENDESA,
Chile,
59. See
http://www.endesa.com/en/aboutEndesa/businessLines/principalesproyectos/Chile (last visited Sept. 20,
2013) (projecting that when completed, the plants will produce energy that is equivalent to 35% of
Chile's consumption) [hereinafter Chile, ENDESA].
60. Mark Briggs, Chile's Reliance on Hydropower: A Risky Gamble in an Increasingly Dry
Energy Climate, SANTIAGO TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011, 8:34 PM), http://www.santiagotimes.cl/opinion/oped/20800-chiles-reliance-on-hydropower-a-risky-gamble-in-an-increasingly-dry-energy-climate.
61. NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, BUILDING A BRIGHTER FUTURE: REALIZING CHILE'S
POTENTIAL TO BECOME A LEADER IN RENEWABLE ENERGY AND EFFICIENCY 1 (2011), available at

http://www.nrdc.org/intemational/files/chilebuildingbrighter.pdf
62. Briggs, supra note 60.
63. Id. See also EMABASSY OF SWITZERLAND IN CHILE, THE CHILEAN ENERGY MARKET 1-4

at
available
(2011),
http://www.osec.ch/sites/default/files/The%20Chilean%20Energy/20MarketEmbassy/o200f/20Swit
zerland%20in%20Chile.pdf.
64. See EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND IN CHILE, supra note 63, at 3. See also Tom Azzopardi,

PM),
2011,
6:35
(Apr.
20,
MAG.
BUS.
CHILE
Chile's Drought Dilemma,
http://www.businesschile.cl/en/news/water/chileE2%80%99s-drought-dilemma.
65. See Chile, ENDESA, supra note 59. Sources disagree about how much power the project will
actually increase the SIC's capacity. Compare Jude Weber, Power Generation:Energy Plans Require

524

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 41:4

project externalizes the negative impacts onto the local human and natural
population, including high-voltage power transmission issues, regional seismic
uncertainty, social displacement, and irreversible environmental damage.66
Furthermore, many opponents have pointed out that increasing water
scarcities make Chile's reliance on hydropower a losing proposition.67 For
example, a recent United Nations Environmental Programme study concluded that
Alaskan and Patagonian glaciers are melting at the world's fastest rate due to
warmer average temperatures and longer warm seasons.68 Rapid glacial melt
diminishes water supply over time by unlocking a higher proportion of fresh water
annually. 69 When a glacier recedes entirely, it no longer acts as a natural water
tower for the communities it serves, and leaves those communities extremely
vulnerable to water shortages and resource conflicts. 70 Both the Baker and Pascua
Rivers, which would be dammed, rely on glacial melt for their flow.7 ' Therefore,
with less water available, the HidroAysdn project provides, at best, a short-term
solution to the country's energy problem. 72
Other possible answers to address Chile's energy needs, however, face similar
limitations and remain largely untested. A March 2011 agreement with the United
States officially started a serious nuclear energy feasibility study in Chile.
A
nuclear power plant could be built along the SIC, providing energy without large
transmission losses. However, nuclear power plants require at least as much water
to operate as traditional thermoelectric (carbon-based) power plants, although

PR and Fat Purses, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011, 2:59 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d342a236-e837IleO-9fc7-00144feab49a.html#axzzlmbRs04AG (estimating that it will increase capacity by 25
percent), with Aaron Nelsen, Chile Dams its Rivers to Unleash its Economy, TIME (May 11, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2070816,00.html (stating that the dams will boost
capacity by thirty-three percent).
66. See, e.g., Benjamin Witte, Chile Patagonia Dam Debate Escalates, ENERGY PROBE RES.
FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2008), http://eprf.probeintemational.org/node/7314; see also Chile's Dam Complex
Faces Green Fury, UPI (Nov. 9, 2010, 6:41 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business News/EnergyResources/2010/ll1/09/Chiles-dam-complex-faces-green-fury/UPI-41741289302878.
67. Briggs, supra note 60.
68. UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, HIGH MOUNTAIN GLACIERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
CHALLENGES TO HUMAN LIVELIHOODS AND ADAPTION 11-13 (B.P. Kaltenbom et al. eds., 2010).

69. Kelley Lubovich, The Coming Crisis: Water Insecurity in Peru, FESS ISSUE BRIEF, Sept.
2007,
at
1,
3,
available
at
http://www.fessglobal.org/publications/issuebriefs/thecomingcrisis water insecurity inperu.pdf.
70. Id. at 4.
71. See Nelsen, supra note 65.
72. Peru, which has suffered from high rates of glacial melt, also relies heavily on hydroelectric
power and has begun to deal with resource conflicts due to scarcities that experts have linked to rapid
glacial melt. Lubovich, supra note 69, at 3-6.
73. Chile, US Sign a Nuclear Agreement Despite Crisis, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 20, 2011),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/print/2011/03/20/2003498677. See also US and Chile Sign
Nuclear Deal Amid Japan Fears, BBC NEWS
(Mar.
18, 2011,
2:57
PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-ameica-1 2792299?print-rue.
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much of it escapes as steam from the nuclear cooling process. 74 Thus, limited
water resources may hamstring nuclear development because it will face water
shortage issues similar to those applicable to hydroelectric power. Chile's seismic
activity also poses a barrier to nuclear development: Chile's long coastline makes
it especially vulnerable to earthquake-generated tsunamis, as seen in Chile's 2010
earthquake/tsunami twin disaster and more recently with Japan's tsunami-caused
75
nuclear plant crisis.
Chile also has one of the world's best solar energy sources, the vast Atacama
Desert in the north.7 6 The Atacama Desert is ideally suited to solar thermal
production because of its high altitude, 365 days of sunlight, and already existing
power lines on the land. 7 Experts estimate that a solar array in the Atacama would
provide as much energy in a more economic and less environmentally costly
79
manner.78 Although water use remains a concern for solar energy production,
both forms of energy could be produced closer to Santiago and fast-growing
northern cities such as Arica and Antofagasta, where demand for energy is growing
the fastest.80
Finally, transmission problems have arguably dissuaded previous generators
from taking advantage of energy opportunities in the Ays6n region.8 ' ENDESA
successfully argued that the HidroAysdn project's Environmental Impact
Assessment did not have to include the transmission line because ENDESA would

74. R. GOLDSTEIN & W. SMITH, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST., 3 WATER & SUSTAINABILITY:
US WATER CONSUMPTION FOR POWER PRODUCTION-THE NEXT HALF-CENTURY 2-1 to 2-2 (2002),

available
http://www.epri.com/abstracts/Pages/ProductAbstract.aspxProductld=000000000001006786.

at
See also

PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, WATER REQUIREMENTS OF NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS 1-2 (Dec. 4,

at
available
2006),
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/download/library/prspub/OMOL6/upload binary/omol62.pdf;fileTy
pe=application%2Fpdf#search=%22Water+Requirements+of+NuclearPower+Stations%22.
75. See FIERRO, supra note 4, at 15-16. See also Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The
Geography of Human Capability, 23 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 23, 29, 38-39 (2012). Chile's 2010
earthquake and tsunami are briefly documented by the U.S. Government. Tsunami Event-February27,
RES.,
FOR
TSUNAMI
CENTER
NOAA
Event
Page,
Main
2010
Chile:
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/chile20l00227 (last visited March 13, 2013).
76. Erin Allen, Solar Energy Conference in Chile Brings Together World Experts, MERCOPRESS
(Urm.) (June 22, 2011, 11:54 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/2011/06/22/solar-energy-conference-inchile-brings-together-world-experts.
77. Id.
78. Investigadores chilenos de siete universidades desrrollan Iniciativa en energia solar, EMOL
(Chile)
(Jan.
19,
2011),
http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/detalle/detallenoticias.aspidnoticia-459489.
79. See, e.g., Todd Woody, Water Use by Solar Projects Intensifies, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2009,
9:19 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/water-use-by-solar-projects-intensifies.
80. See Allen, supra note 76 (noting that the northern region of Chile, including Arica and
Antofagasta, is particularly suited for solar energy due to their altitude and weather).
81. See Letter from Juan Pablo Orrego S., Dir., Ecosistemas, to David Denison, President & CEO,
CPP Inv. Bd. (May 15, 2009), available at http://joumal.probeintemational.org/2009/05/15/cppinvestment-board-urged-abandon-controversial-chilean-transmission-scheme.
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not construct it, and thus had no duty to account for its environmental impact. 82 A
transmission line connecting any energy generation project in Aysin to the
country's SIC would run 1,500 miles, through multiple national parks, public
lands, and numerous private lands, in nine administrative regions throughout
Chile.83 Multiple studies have emerged in the past decade concluding that largescale hydroelectric dams may have no net positive impact to curbing greenhouse
gas production.84 In particular, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT")
study calculates that the proposed transmission line will contribute seventy percent
of the HidroAys6n project's greenhouse gas emissions because it will require a
clear-cut through heavily forested regions in southern and central Chile.85 Despite
framing hydroelectric energy as a green alternative, the HidroAys6n project will
still emit over three million tons of carbon dioxide during its lifespan, primarily
because of the land-use changes associated with a transmission line. 86
Thus, Chile's continued reliance on hydroelectric energy makes little sense
other than as an extension of Pinochet's radical restructuring of the Water Code
and privatization of the energy agency. Despite the high risks involved in
continued reliance on hydroelectric power, the country continues to develop large
dam projects because its free-market legal system has encouraged private
companies like ENDESA to invest. Chile's legal framework has allowed
ENDESA to make socially and environmentally risky investments in order to take
advantage of their virtual monopoly over water resources. The fact that ENDESA
successfully moved the HidroAys6n project through the environmental review
process reflects the need to revamp the environmental regulatory system in order to

82. CENTRALES HIDROELECTRICAS
HIDROELECTRICO AYSEN, ESTUDIO DE

DE AYStN S.A.,
RESUMEN EJECUTIVO, PROYECTO
IMPACTO AMBIENTAL 9 (2008) (Chile), available at

http://bibliotecaverde.wikieco.org/wp-content/plugins/downloadsmanager/upload/01_Resumen Ejecutivo.pdf. See also Letter from Juan Pablo Orrego S. to David
Denison (May 15, 2009), supra note 81. At some point after the favorable court decisions, Endesa and
Colbun apparently changed their position because they now openly assume responsibility for the
transmission part of the project if and when it ever starts. See, e.g., Randall Woods & Sebastian Boyd,
Patagonia Protests Lead Colbun to Backpedal on Chile Dam, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012, 9:03 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31 /patagonia-protests-lead-endesa-partner-to-backpedal-onchile-dam.html.
83. Letter from Juan Pablo Orrego S. to David Denison (May 15, 2009), supra note 81.
84. WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-

MAKING

75-77

(2000),

available

at

http://www.intemationalrivers.org/files/attached-

files/world commission on dams final-report.pdf. See also THE ASOCIACION INTERAMERICANA PARA
LA DEFENSA DEL AMBIENTE, GRANDES REPRESAS EN AMERICA: PEOR EL REMEDIO QUE LA
ENFERMEDAD?: PRINCIPALES CONSEQUENCIAS AMBIENTALES Y EN LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS Y

http://www.aida(2009)
(Colom.),
available
at
POSIBLES
ALTERNATIVAS
56-57
americas.org/sites/default/files/InformeAIDAGrandesRepreseas BajaRes.pdf.
85. Kristen Burrall et al., Analysis of Proposed Hydroelectric Dams on the Rio Baker in Chilean
Patagonia 32 (2009) (unpublished M.E. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of
available
at
Environmental
Engineering),
Civil
and
http://www.waterdeva.com/pdfs/Burrallet al 2009.pdf.
86. See id. at 16.

2013

THE HIDROAYSEN NORTHERN PATAGONIA DAMS MEGAPROJECT

527

give government agencies actual, rather than theoretical, power to determine
whether to permit future projects.
2.

The HidroAyskn Project's Polarization of Ays6n's Resident and
Mobilization of National and International Opposition

Placing the HidroAys6n project within Chile's geopolitical framework may
explain why the project has aroused such strong sentiments. Chile's Ays6n region
sits in Chile's Patagonia, geographically isolated from other parts of the country by
deep glacial fjords along the coast and impenetrable ice fields along the length of
its northern and southern boundaries.8 7 It thus shares more traditions with
neighboring Argentina than the rest of Chile, and has become nationally famous
for its wild spaces and intractable distain for Santiago politicians.8 8 Additionally,
only 91,494 people live dispersed over Ays6n's 41,890 square miles (108,494
square kilometers), about the same size as the U.S. State of Tennessee (and
remarkably similar in appearance if Tennessee's east-west width were changed to
face north and south). 89 With a population density of roughly 2.2 people per
square mile, it would rank ahead only of Alaska in population density if it were a
state in the United States. 90
The region's population also remains divided on major economic
development projects. The HidroAys6n project will purportedly bring wealth to
the region, but also threatens a tourist economy that has grown in the past decade
to become a viable regional economic driver. 91 As a result, the HidroAys6n project
has drawn strong opposition, with local grassroots organization Patagonia Sin
Represas (Patagonia without Dams) spearheading local campaigns and organizing
protests.92 The project does have some local support, however, in part because of
87. Although Region XIl (Magallanes) lies further south of Ays6n, Ays6n does not have the
natural ports that exist in Magallanes that allow for easy transfer of goods and services. Likewise,
Aysdn and Magallanes are separated by the Southern Ice Field, the Western Hemisphere's second
largest ice field. See AYStN REG'L Gov'T ET AL., AYSEN: MATICES DE UNA IDENTIDAD QUE ASOMA
/SHADES OF AN EMERGING IDENTITY, 51 (2009), available at http://www.territoriochile.cl/1 516/articles-

83982_recurso_1.pdf.
88. See id. at 12, 28-29, 46-47.
89. Daniela Estrada, CHILE: Mega Dams, Mega Impacts, Mega Half-Truths, INTER PRESS SERV.
NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 25, 2007), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39399.
90. Alaska's 2010 population density is 1.2 people per square mile, and Wyoming has the next
lowest population density, at 5.8 people per square mile. Resident Population Data, UNITED STATES
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php (last visited
Sept. 26, 2012).
91. Interview with Kris Tompkins, in Estancia Valle Chacabuco, Chile (Jan. 13, 2011). Compare
Warren & Vergara, supra note 2 (highlighting the potential development that could result in the region)
and Letter from Juan Pablo Orrego S. to David Denison (May 15, 2009), supra note 81 (highlighting
the threat to the tourist industry in the region).
92. See PATAGONIA SIN REPRESAS (Chile), http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.clfinallindex.php
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012). In addition, a full-length documentary highlights local opposition to the
project from its early stages. See Sin Represas, 180 DEGREES SOUTH: CONQUERORS OF THE USELESS,
http://www.180south.com/sin represas.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
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ENDESA's aggressive public relations campaign to tout the project's benefits. 93
For example, ENDESA's literature promises that these dams will increase energy
capacity,94 but a company official admitted that "every last drop" of energy
generated from the dams will go directly to Santiago. 95 Instead, ENDESA quietly
plans to build ten smaller dams on other rivers in the region that will generate
energy for the population. 96 Additionally, the company promises to reduce energy
costs for the region,97 but an interview with HidroAysdn officials determined that it
has not developed a concrete plan for energy cost reduction." The company has
nonetheless introduced a high-profile public relations campaign-including
university scholarships for Aysdn regional students and expenditures on local
infrastructural projects-to win local support. 99
Likewise, local, national, and international environmental and legal
organizations worked to postpone the HidroAys6n project's Environmental Impact
Assessment ("EIA").'0o Collectively, these organizations call themselves Consejo
de Defensa de la Patagonia Chilena ("Patagonian Defense Council").' 0' This
Council includes local ranchers, priests, lawyers, and nongovernmental
organizations, as well as international organizations and celebrities such as:
International Rivers, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (Natural Resource Defense Council),
Yvon Chounard (founder of Patagonia clothing company), and Douglas and Kris
Tompkins (American philanthropists and founders of Conservacidn Patag6nica,
who built and now operate Pumalin, one of the world's largest private national
parks).102 The organizations' efforts worried Chilean officials and reportedly

93. Diego Cupolo, Tough Questionsfor Chile as Ongoing ProtestsStall PatagonianDam Project,
UPSIDE DOWN WORLD (Feb. 20, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/chile-archives34/4142-tough-questions-for-chile-as-ongoing-protests-stal-patagonian-dam-project.
94. Chile, ENDESA, supranote 59.
95. Conversation with HidroAysdn Official, in Coyhaique, Aysdn, Chile (Jan. 17, 2011) (on file
with author).
96. Id.
97. Matt Craze & Randy Woods, Endesa 's HidroAysen Project Approved by Chilean Authorities
Amid Protests, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0509/pinera-uses-chile-mine-rescue-head-to-sell-patagonia-hydro-power-project.html.
98. Conversation with HidroAys6n Official, supra note 95.
99. Cupolo, supra note 93.
100. See
Patagonia
Sin
Represas,
INT'L
RIVERS,
http://www.internationalrivers.org/catihpaigns/patagonia-sin-represas (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
101. Quidnes
Somos,
PATAGONIA
CHILENA
iSIN
REPRESAS!,
http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl/final/quienes-somos.php (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
102. Id.

See

also

History,

PUMALIN

PARK

(CHILE),

http://www.parquepumalin.cl/content/eng/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). The transmission
route plan responded to objections over using Pumalin Park land by deciding on an underwater cable
for this part of the route, although many other parks remain on the route. Ivonne Toro, Gobiernoestudia
cableado submarino que complica a HidroAysin, LA TERCERA (Chile) (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://diario.latercera.com. See also Amanda Maxwell, Latin America Climate, Energy, and
Environmental News 10/31-11/4/2011, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://switchboard.nrdc.orgfblogs/amaxwelVlaclimate-energyenvironmenta I.html.
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caused the three-year delay in the EIA approval before it was ultimately approved
on May 13, 2011.'0
Although citizens have taken to the streets to protest the project, 10 4 and public
approval remains low, support for the project continues amongst high-ranking
government officials. Current President Sebastiin Pifiera not only has strongly
supported the project, but he has made the development of hydroelectric projects a
priority in his administration, publicly stating that he hopes hydroelectric power
accounts for fifty percent of Chile's energy output within twenty years. 05 Former
President Lagos also supported the project and deemed the project "necessary."' 06
Maria Isabel Gonzalez, the former head of Chile's National Energy Commission
has stated:
Chile is still a poor country, with 2.5 million poor people, and to
overcome poverty we need energy, and for that reason we need to
develop our own resources, the most competitive ones.

. .

. It would be

very selfish on the part of the rich countries to say, 'Look how they are
destroying these uninhabited pristine areas.' 0 7
This comment reveals that some influential Chilean officials bristle when
outside forces attempt to dictate the terms of Chile's economic development,
particularly how the country chooses to develop its own resources.
Most recently, the HidroAysin project appears to have influenced Chile's
2013 presidential election campaign, with candidates forced to answer pointed
questions regarding their support or opposition for the project. Vota sin Represas,
a grassroots organization, has played a major role in determining the candidates'
positions by asking all candidates to publicly sign a pledge opposing the project.os
Though neither major party candidate has signed the pledge, the current
presidential frontrunner, former President Michelle Bachelet, has come out

103. Andrea Hartung, Corte de Apelaciones de Puerto Montt rechaza recursoscontra HidroAysin,
LA TERCERA (Chile) (Oct. 6, 2011, 2:21 PM), http://latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2011/10/680397349-9-corte-de-apelaciones-de-puerto-montt-rechaza-recursos-contra-hidroaysen.shtml#.
See also
Amanda Maxwell, A SurpriseAnnouncement ParalyzedHidroAysin, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL
(May 31, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amaxwell/asurprise-announcement_paraly.html.
104. Annie Murphy, Plansfor Dams in PatagoniaDraw Ire from Chileans, NPR (June 1, 2011,
3:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/06/09/136855319/plans-for-dams-in-patagonia-draw-ire-fromchileans.
105. A. Astudillo & C. Pizarro, Pillera delinea nuevo plan energetico y do fuerte respaldo a la
hidroelectridad,
LA
TERCERA
(Chile)
(Jan.
13,
2012),
http://diario.latercera.com/2012/01/13/01/contenido/negocios/ 0-97025-9-pinera-delinea-nuevo-planenergetico-y-da-fuerte-respaldo-a-la-hidroelectridad.shtml.
106. Ex presidente Lagos asegura que proyecto Hidroaysen "es necesario ", TERRA (Colum.) (May
2011),
15,
http://economia.terra.com.co/noticias/noticia.aspx?idNoticia=201105151509 UPI 79701199.
107. Michael Warren & Eva Vergara, Chile Approves Huge Dam Project in Wild Patagonia,STAR
TRIBUNE (May 9, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://www.startribune.com/printarticle/?id=121525944.
108. Kate Ross, HidroAysin Not the Right Futurefor Chile, INT'L RIVERS (Aug. 14, 2013, 2:57
PM), http://www.intemationalrivers.org/blogs/259/hidroaysdn-not-the-right-future-for-chile.
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strongly against the Project in response to Vota sin Represas' public pressure.to9
Notably, she posed on billboards in the capital bearing the slogan "We are
Patagonia Sin Represas."il 0 Additionally, Bachelet affirmed in an interview that
HidroAys6n should be shelved because it is not a viable project, and further that
she would be open to assessing alternatives to hydroelectric production."'
Bachelet's main opponent, Evelyn Matthei, has neither opposed nor openly
supported the project. Matthei served as Labour Minister under current Chilean
President Sebastian Pifiera from January 2011 until July 2013.112 Pifiera-and his
cabinet-have offered strong support for HidroAys6n since it was approved in
2011, despite growing opposition to the project." 3 During the campaign Matthei
has remained coy about her position.11 4
Sebastian Bernstein, Matthei's
spokesperson for energy and environment, has dodged the question whether
Matthei would oppose HidroAys6n. 5 Instead, Bernstein stated that Matthei
would investigate an alternative to any new large power project proposal if either
the Chilean population or the political establishment did not wholly support that
project.
Given Matthei's involvement in Pifiera's government, her refusal to
openly support the project speaks to HidroAysdn's potential to act as political
kryptonite. Matthei's fading presidential hopes make her muddled position on the
HidroAys6n project less relevant than Bachelet's public opposition." 7
Politics aside, part III of this article below develops the environmental
regulatory framework that existed when the HidroAys6n project began,
highlighting the former legislation's weaknesses to demonstrate why the EIA was
approved.
Lastly, it describes why Chile transitioned to a more robust
environmental management regime.

109. Id.
I 10. Id.
111. Victor Toloza Jim6nez, Entrevista, Michelle Bachelet, candidata de la Nueva Mayoria, EL
MERCURIO
DE
ANTOFAGASTA
(Chile)
(July
20,
2013),
http://www.mercurioantofagasta.cl/impresa/2013/07/20/full5.
112. See Chile Labour Minister Evelyn Matthei to Run for President, BBC (July 20, 2013, 9:23
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23392856.
113. G.L. Santiago, How the Mighty Have Fallen, THE ECONOMIST (Jun. 14, 2011, 12:48 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2011/06/chiles-politics.
114. Jefe programdtico de Matthei: "Esfuerzos en materia social se haran sin sacrificar la
economia,"
EMOL
(Chile)
(Aug.
13,
2013),
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2013/08/13/614339/matthei-y-equipo-programatico.html.
115. Hernin Vargas S., Comando de Matthei analiza encuesta ciudadanapara definir viabilidad
del
proyecto
HidroAysen,
LA
SEGUNDA
ONLINE
(Chile)
(Oct.
15,
2013),
http://www.lasegunda.com/Noticias/Economia/2013/10/885848/comando-de-matthei-analiza-encuestaciudadana-para-definir-viabilidad-del-proyecto-hidroaysen.
116. Id.
117. Michelle Bachelet won 47% of the vote in the election, however failed to get the requisite
50% for victory. Jonathan Franklin, Bachelet Faces Runoff Against Matthei in Chile's Presidential
Election,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
18,
2013,
3:41
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/1 8/bachelet-runoff-matthei-chile-presidential-election.
Bachelet faces a run off against Evelyn Matthei on December 15, 2013. Id.
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III. CHILE'S ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WAS DEVELOPED TO
CAPITALIZE ON PROMISED INTERNATIONAL TRADE PARTNERSHIPS

Chile's environmental management regime has developed in fits and starts
alongside its meteoric economic growth." 8 This part describes how the promise of
private foreign investment-fuelled by international trade agreements-has
provided one strong incentive for Chile to strengthen its environmental framework
laws. It begins with a short history of Chile's pre-1994 attempts at environmental
laws, then introduces and critiques the 1994 Environmental Framework Law. The
final subsection explains that accession to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") spurred discussion within Chile to revisit
and strengthen the 1994 law.
A.

Despite InternationalPressure Chile Lacked Meaningful Environmental
Protectionbefore 1994

During Pinochet's dictatorship Chile began trying to integrate into the
international trade community." 9 However, its lack of comprehensible and
overarching environmental standards threatened to impede its economic growth.1 20
For instance, the growth-at-all-costs mentality during the dictatorship ignored the
environmental costs of Chile's growing economy, putting the country at risk of
becoming a pollution haven-a country with weak environmental laws where
multinational corporations could operate with little or no oversight from
In fact, throughout the dictatorship Chile's
environmental legal regimes.121
legislature only occasionally enacted emergency measures designed to protect
public health.122 Without meaningful legislation, both foreign and domestic
companies benefited from Chile's failure to regulate pollutants; Chile's industrial
boom had produced not only economic growth, but also air quality in Santiago that
ranked among the world's worst; 123 loss of native tree, plant, and animal species
caused by deforestation;' 24 and highly contaminated water resources near the

118. Tara Bunker, Comment, Environmental Upgrade: The Potential for Chile to Use Market
Incentives in Preparingfor NAFTA Accession, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 165, 166 (1997).
119. See Heather Walsh, Augusto Pinochet, Chilean Dictator for 17 Years, Dies, BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
10,
2006,
5:15
PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aHzYOpudu4as&referhome.
120. See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall & David Wheeler, Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin
America: Where are the Pollution Havens?, 2 J. ENV'T & DEv 137, 141-42 (1993).
121. Id.
I 22. See Jay V. Sagar, Note, The Labor and Environment Chapters of the United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement: An Improvement Over the Weak Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Side
Agreements on Labor and the Environment?, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 913, 944-48 (2004). See
also Jeffrey Lax, A Chile Forecast for Accession to NAFTA: A Process of Economic, Legal and
Environmental Harmonization, 7 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 97, 133-34 (1999).
123. Other cities with similar pollution levels in 1992, as measured by particulate matter, included
Calcutta, Beijing, Tehran, Mexico City, and Bangkok. See Marcela Rabi, Chile Air Pollution, TRADE &
ENVIRONMENT DATABASE (Jan. 11, 1997), http://wwwl.american.edu/TED/class/ail.htm.
124. Patricio Meller et al., Growth, Equity, and the Environment in Chile: Issues and Evidence, 24
WORLD DEV. 255, 263 (1996).
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northern copper mines. 125
A return to democracy in 1990 brought about public debate and official
government recognition of the country's environmental problems,126 but the
government was slow to act until 1992, when the United States' Government
Accountability Office ("U.S. GAO") warned that "Chile's continued
environmental negligence would jeopardize its potential accession to NAFTA [the
North American Free Trade Agreement]." 27 The possibility that Chile would
"lose out on a free-trade agreement ... due to a poor environmental record" 28
drove the government to begin formulating environmental protection laws.129
B.

Interpreting Chile's ConstitutionalEnvironmentalProvisions

The Chilean Constitution guarantees its citizens the right to live in an
environment free from contamination and creates an affirmative obligation on the
government of Chile to serve as a guardian for the preservation of nature and the
environment.130 Even before LSBMA, Chile's Supreme Court interpreted these
constitutional provisions liberally, and several cases shed light on these broadly
phrased environmental protections. First, in Comunidad de Chailaralv. Codeco
Divisi6n el Saldor, the Court upheld the right of a farmer to bring a claim to enjoin
drainage of Lake Chungard based upon the constitutional "right to life."'' Here,
the Court found that the right to a clean environment is owed not only to
individuals and communities, but also to future generations.132 In a case three
years later, Pedro Floresy Otros v. CorporacionDel Cobre, Codeloco, the Chilean
Supreme Court ruled that "the preservation of nature and the conservation of the
environmental heritage is an obligation of the State, according to the [Chilean]
Constitution."1
In Pedro Flores residents of Chafiaral filed suit against a copper
mine to "restrain the company from continuing to discharge [mine] tailings on the
local beaches and coves."l34 After a site visit, the Court enjoined all further
discharges within one year.135 Shortly after the enactment of Ley sobre Bases
Generales de Medio Ambiente, the Chilean Supreme Court made a landmark

125. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Chilean Town Withers in Free Market for Water, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/world/americas/15chile.html.
126. See Birdsall & Wheeler, supra note 120, at 141.
127. Lax, supra note 122, at 135.
128. Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chilean Accession to NAFTA: U.S. Failure and Chilean
Success, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 53, 80 (1997).
129. Id. at 79-80.
130. CONSTITUC16N POLITICA DE LA REPOIBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 19(1) & 19(8).

131. Barry E. Hill et al., Human Rights and the Environment: A Synopsis and Some Predictions, 16
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 359, 387 (2004).
132. Id. at 387.
133. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 28 julio 1988, "Pedro Flores y Otros c.
Corporacion Del Cobre, Codelco," Rol de la causa: 12.753.FS 641, (Chile). See also Hill et al., supra
note 131 at 387-88.
134. Hill et al., supra note 131, at 387-88.
135. Id. at 388.
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decision in a case known as Trillium.'36 This decision turned directly on the
question of sustainability.' 37 An entrepreneur from Seattle sought to harvest dwarf
trees in the forest in Tierra del Fuego, an area of Chile that is often regarded as the
end of the world.' 38 Trillium submitted its plan for environmental review, and
received approval for the project. A citizen suit followed, and the Chilean
Supreme Court found that the approval "violated the country's constitutional
environmental 'right to live in an environment free from contamination."'" 39 By
allowing the citizen suit, the Chilean Supreme Court "clarified that direct,
individual harm need not be shown to enforce the constitutional environmental
right to be free of environmental contamination." 40
C.

Chile's 1994 EnvironmentalFrameworkLaw was Enacted to Take
Advantage of a PotentialFree Trade Agreement with the United States

Chile, in response to the U.S. GAO's rebuke of its environmental framework,
formulated the Environmental Framework Law, Ley 19.300 (Ley Sobre Bases
Generales del Medio Ambiente, or "LSBMA") in 1994.141 Chilean lawmakers
based the LSBMA on the United States' National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), both in form and function, acting as a broad-based law intended to
infuse environmental ethos into governmental and private activities.14 2 The
country's subsequent development of major environmental regulations strongly
suggests that Chile developed LSBMA in order to mollify the United States and
pave the way for its accession to NAFTA.1 43
Among other provisions, LSBMA developed two key relevant components.
First, Article 69 established a National Environmental Commission (Comisiin
Nacional del Medio Ambiente, or "CONAMA").144 As originally formulated,
CONAMA set environmental policies and promulgated regulations.1 45
136. See Chile-Trillium, March
19, 1997,
ENvTL.
L. ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE,
http://www.elaw.org/node/1310 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013). See generally OLIVER A. HOUCK, TAKING
BACK EDEN: EIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL CASES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD, 151-174 (2010) (the story
behind the Trillium case).
137. See Chile-Trillium, March 19, 1997, supra note 136.
138. Oliver A. Houck, A Case of Sustainable Development: The River God and the Forest a! the
End ofthe World, 44 TULSA L. REV. 275, 294-95 (2008).
139. James R. May & Erin Daly, Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, II
OR. REV. INT'L L. 365, 392 (2009).
140. Hill et al., supra note 131, at 388. Although Trillium later received approval to continue
logging under a new law, the delay and public scrutiny derailed the project. HOUCK, supra note 136, at
167-69. Trillium's project finance debt was acquired by Goldman Sachs and Trillium relinquished the
property to extinguish the debt. Id at 169. Goldman placed the property in its charitable trust, which
then transferred it to a non-profit organization to operate as a natural reserve. Id. at 170.
141. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.-CHILEAN TRADE: PESTICIDE STANDARDS AND
CONCERNS REGARDING CHILEAN SANITARY RULES 38 (1994).

142. Sagar, supra note 122, at 944-46 (NEPA laid the federal requirements for environmental
impact assessments).
143. See Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 128, at 80.
144. Law No. 19300, art. 69, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
145. OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supra note 9, at 16.
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Additionally, CONAMA fostered the integration of environmental concerns into
other areas of Chile's domestic policy. 146 Each region in Chile counted on a
Regional Environmental Commission (Comisi6n Regional del Medio Ambiente, or
"COREMA") to which CONAMA delegated powers to review proposed
development projects that impacted the environment in each of Chile's twelve
regions. 147
Second, LSBMA incorporated the Environmental Impact Evaluation System
(Sistema de Evaluaci6n de Impacto Ambiental or "SEIA"), 14 8 a system of
environmental regulations and accompanying enforcement mechanisms, under the
auspices of CONAMA.1 49 In general, the SEIA was designed to "incorporate the
environmental dimension in the building, operation, closure and decommissioning
of public and private projects or activities."15 0 The SEIA oversees and evaluates
Environmental Impact Assessments (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, or "EIA") and
Declarations of Environmental Impact (Declaraci6n de Impacto Ambiental, or
"DIA").1si These proposals closely parallel the U.S. EPA's Environmental Impact
Statement and Environmental Assessment, respectively.1 52
Under the SEIA, all companies or entities taking any action that may harm the
environment must submit their proposal to SEIA.153 In particular, Article 10 of
LSBMA (adopted verbatim as Article 3 of the SEIA regulations), requires
"projects or activities likely to cause environmental impact, at any of their phases"
to submit an EIA.154 The current iteration of Article 10 lists eighteen distinct
categories of projects subject to developing an EIA, including reservoirs,
transmission lines, and energy sources larger than three mega-watts.15 5
Article 16 of LSBMA directs CONAMA or its regional subsidiaries to
approve an EIA, if it complies with the applicable environmental regulations.156
To qualify, an EIA must propose "mitigation, compensation or reparation
measures" for aspects of a project that will: impact public health; damage air,
water, and soil quality; significantly alter the landscape, cultural heritage, or
touristic value; or require a significant alteration to human communities. s7

146. Id.
147. See id. at 138.
148. Id. at 127-28 (explaining that the SElA predated the LSBMA but languished until the LSBMA
integrated it as a tool for evaluating environmental impact).
149. Law No. 19300, art. 8, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
150. OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supra note 9, at 127.
151. GRN: Declaracian de impacto ambiental, GRN GESTI6N EN RECURSOS NATURALES (Chile),
http://www.grn.cl/declaracion-de-impacto-ambiental.html (last visited May 1, 2013).
152. See Sagar, supra note 122, at 946.
153. Zahralddin-Aravena, supranote 128, at 86.
154. Law No. 19300, art. 10, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). Chile-Reglamento
del Sistema de Evaluacidn de Impacto Ambiental, ENVTL. L. ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE,
http://www.elaw.org/node/1350 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
155. Law No. 19300, art. 10, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
156. Id. art. 16.
157. Id. art. 11.
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Theoretically, every single hydroelectric dam project will require an EIA under at
least one of those criteria because it will significantly alter a landscape by
inundating significant amounts of land, force communities or families to relocate,
or impact the development of cultural heritage or tourist sites. Additionally,
LSBMA gave CONAMA the sole authority to accept or reject projects submitted
to the SEIA.'s Initially, the SEIA process operated on a voluntary basis, but after
1997 it became mandatory for all public and private actions that would have an
environmental impact. 59
D.

Chile's EnvironmentalLaw's Limitations,Including a Failureto
Adequately Empower CONA MA, EncouragedHydroelectric
Development andResulted in an Overemphasis on ProjectApproval

In practice, LSBMA presented two major hurdles to effective environmental
management in the hydroelectric dam context: (1) CONAMA did not have the
capacity or mandate to carry out its necessary functions on all levels; and (2) the
SEIA's procedure favored approval over rejection.
First, because government regulation theoretically disrupts the free market
from functioning at a high level, Pinochet's Constitution minimized administrative
Thus, although CONAMA oversaw adoption of
agencies' powers. 1o
environmental regulations it never had the firepower to ensure compliance.16 '
Instead, enforcement remained primarily sectorial, meaning that various other
government agencies oversaw environmental enforcement for similar activities
taking place in different contexts. Using water as an example, the Public Works
Ministry tracked water rights and enforced water quality standards in freshwater
systems while the Defense Ministry oversaw marine sewage discharge, and the
Mining Ministry monitored all environmental enforcement for mining waste and
tailings.' 62 1In order to determine a project's environmental impact, for example,
CONAMA had to approach as many as twenty-two separate agencies with
conflicting interests to decide whether or not to issue a permit.1 63 Thus, instead of
consolidating compliance and enforcement under one agency, LSBMA merely
authorized a new agency with limited jurisdictional power to manage
environmental issues across other Chilean agencies. It did not grant CONAMA a
sweeping mandate to make drastic changes.
Second, the vast majority of proposals submitted under SEIA have been
This suggests that development, rather than environmental
approved.16
In the first place,
protection, formed LSBMA's primary legislative intent.'6
158. Id. art.9.
159. OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supra note 9, at 127.
160. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supranote 19, at 35-36.
161. See id. at 128.
162. OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supra note 9, at 128-29.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 127 (interpreting the data contained in the table).
165. See Fernando Campos Media & Luis Campos Medina, The Environmental Institution in Chile:
A Political Representation of the Ecological Crisis, Address to the 2012 Berlin Conference on the
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Article 17 of LSBMA granted a strong presumption of approval to project
proposals by declaring that if CONAMA failed to act within 120 days, then it
would be assumed that the agency approved them. 166 Considering that CONAMA
had to consult multiple agencies, assess a proposal from environmental, socioeconomic, and sustainable development perspectives, and present a final answer
within 120 days, an entity seeking approval could attempt to make the proposal as
onerous and complicated as possible in order to stretch the agency's resources.
Moreover, if CONAMA rejected a proposal it had to present certain changes that
the potential permittee could make that would ensure the project's approval,
effectively permitting the project's proponent to develop alternatives that would
not be subject to the public participation process.' 68 In short, the legislation gave
possible permittees multiple opportunities to secure a permit either by default or
through tweaking their proposals until they matched CONAMA's specifications
for approval. Critics have denounced this approach as a thinly veiled attempt to
validate projects while still ensuring maximum economic development.1 69 One
researcher argued "[t]he system is designed . . . to facilitate projects. It orients

companies so that they can follow the law and meet all the existing
requirements." 70
Although the overall rate of approval does not indicate an overwhelming bias
toward approval-about nineteen percent of all projects were rejected between
1994 and 2003"'-hydroelectric dam projects proposals have fared inordinately
well. CONAMA approved thirty of the thirty-two hydroelectric dam proposals
submitted.172 For instance, CONAMA approved one mega-project-the PangueRalco Dam Complex-that caused an international uproar when an indigenous
group in Chile brought a case before the Inter-American Court for Human Rights
against the government for violating the country's treaty obligations by flooding
native cultural heritage sites and forcibly removing families from their land. 73
Human Dimension of Global Environmental Change 17 (Oct. 5-6, 2012), available at
http://www.berlinconference.org/2012/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Campos MedinaTheEnvironmentalInstitution inChileAPoliticalRepresentation-330.pdf.
166. Law No. 19300, art. 17, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
167. Id. arts. 15-17.
168. Id. art. 16 ("In case of unfavorable ruling on Environmental Impact Study, the decision shall
be substantiated and shall indicate the specific requirements that the proponent must comply."). See
also Hale E. Sheppard, Native Forest Protection in Chile: The Inadequacies of the Recent
Environmental Framework Law and Relevant Multilateral Instruments, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 225,
267-68 (1999) (discussing the short-comings of the current process).
169. David Carruthers, Environmental Politics in Chile: Legacies of Dictatorship and Democracy,
22 THIRD WORLD Q. 343, 349-50 (2001).
170. Benjamin Witte, Chile, Rubber Stamping the Future of its Rivers, SANTIAGO TIMES (Apr. 27,
(quoting Manuel
2009), http://santiagotimes.cl/content/chile-rubber-stamping-the-future-of-its-rivers
Jose Prieto, a doctoral student at the University of Arizona).
171. OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supra note 9, at 127 (referencing Table 5.3).
172. Witte, supra note 170.
173. See Marcos A. Orellana, Indigenous Peoples, Energy, and Environmental Justice: The
Pangue/Ralco Hydroelectric Project in Chile's Alto BioBio, 23 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 511,
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The government narrowly avoided an unfavorable ruling only after committing to a
negotiated settlement with the affected community.174
In brief, these regulations merely formed a paper barrier against
environmental degradation with respect to hydroelectric development. Chile thus
rubber-stamped many hydroelectric projects because the proposed permittee
simply followed the procedural guidelines, and CONAMA did not have the ability
or the mandate to substantively critique environmental damages stemming from
proposed projects. Some commentators noted that SEIA's assessment guidelines
remained too restricted to "environmental" issues without addressing the related
The Pangue-Ralco hydroelectric development
socio-economic factors.1 75
described above exemplifies this argument. 76
Other scholars, however, opined that LSBMA's "comprehensive framework
for protection and enforcement" allowed Chile to enter into numerous free trade
agreements without substantively altering LSBMA.' 77 For example, Chile entered
into agreements with both Canada and Mexico in the 1990s after the United States
78
It also entered into a
failed to deliver on its promise to bring Chile into NAFTA.
Instead of
bilateral free trade agreement with the United States in 2004.'
undertaking a searching review of Chile's environmental regulatory framework,
the United States simply made a side agreement on environmental protection that
prohibited either country from "weaken[ing] its domestic environmental laws in
order to attract investment."'so Chile's LSBMA thus escaped an overhaul.
However, when Chile began to seek full membership in the Organization of
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"), LSBMA came under
scrutiny.
E.

Chile's Full Membership in OECD Reflect a Willingness to Evolve Its
EnvironmentalNorms in Returnfor InternationalTrade Benefits

The OECD formed in 1961 to promote free trade,182 likely as a response to the

523 (2005) (discussing the problems that have arisen from these new dams); see also Lila BarreraHemndez, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource Development: Chile 's Mapuche
Peoples and the Right to Water, II ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 10-24 (2005) (exploring the social
and environmental consequences of constructing dams in Chile).
174. See Orellana,supra note 173, at 523-26.
175. See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 168, at 258-59; see also Orellana, supra note 173, at 527-28
(exploring the social tensions that arise when constructing through rather than around the environment).
176. See Orellana,supranote 173, at 515, 527-28.
177. Sagar, supra note 122, at 946.
178. See Heather Corbin, Notes & Comments, The Proposed United States-Chile Free Trade
Agreement: Reconciling Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y 119, 127 (2003); see also Anthony Faiola, Chile Takes Its Trade Elsewhere, WASH. PosT, Dec.
25, 1997, at A29 (describing the events that led up to Chile and the United States finally signing a free
trade agreement in 2004).
179. Sagar, supra note 122, at 913.
180. Id. at 940.
181. See OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supranote 9, at 15-16.
182. See History, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/history (last
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Soviet Union's increasing Cold War influence. It sought to expand non-member
countries' economies by helping them to open their export markets and improve
their capacity to trade on the global scale.1 83 Over time, the OECD began to
recognize that increased trade opportunities correspond closely to improvements in
environmental standards.'" As a result, it has published a set of environmental
guidelines for multinational enterprises ("MNEs") to follow, encouraging them to
raise their own environmental performance. 185 The basic premise, as stated in the
guidelines, is that MNEs should "act as soon as possible, and in a proactive way, to
avoid . . . serious or irreversible environmental damages resulting from their

activities."
The guidelines apply not to the MNEs, but rather to OECD member
countries; those countries must have adequate environmental regulations and
enforcement regimes that meet or exceed these guidelines.' 8 7 In effect, each
member country's environmental regulatory structure acts as the stick to
complement OECD's carrot.
According to its literature, the OECD environmental regulations "reflect[] the
principles and objectives contained in the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development and in Agenda 21 [on fostering sustainable development]." 8 The
organization sees a strong correlation between free trade and improved
environmental quality from the public and private sectors.1 89 Unlike other
international environmental agreements, however, the OECD environmental
guidelines have only voluntary standards for MNEs, developed with strong input
from financial institutions and civil society networks,1 90 however does not provide
for any compliance mechanism, be it rewards or punishment.191
As an emergent country, Chile has the necessary framework to succeed under
the OECD's guidelines. Chile's free market model mirrors OECD's purpose of
92
promoting economic development through sustainable development principles.1
visited Apr. 3, 2013).
183. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development art. 2(e), Dec.
14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179.
184. See Corbin, supra note 178, at 122.
185. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 14 (2011 ed.).
186. Id. at 46.
187. See Sarah Fick Vendzules, The Strugglefor Legitimacy in Environmental Standards Systems:
The OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 451,460-61
(2010). See also Conversation with Paulina Riquelme, Universidad Andrds Bello, Santiago, Chile (Jan.
4, 2011) (on file with author).
188. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ENVIRONMENT AND THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: CORPORATE TOOLS AND APPROACHES 7 (2007).
189. See Corbin, supra note 178, at 122.

190. See David B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental
Standardsat International Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 437, 437, 447-48 (2008).
191. See Vendzules, supra note 187, at 479.
192. See generally George Matheson & Laurie Giroux, Capacity Developmentfor Environmental
Management and Governance in the Energy Sector in Developing Countries (OECD Environment,
http://www.oecdat
available
2010),
25,
No.
Paper
Working
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Additionally, Chile has among the most well developed environmental regulatory
schemes outside the United States and Europe. As evidenced by its promulgation
of LSBMA, 193 the country has expended significant resources reshaping its
environmental regulations to conform to international environmental quality
standards. In fact, Chile's accession to the OECD in 2010 marks the second time
that the country has restructured its environmental regulatory system in the past
twenty years in response to international trade agreements seeking to impose or
recommend stronger environmental laws.194 Chile fought hard to become a
member of the OECD and is the first South American country to join the OECD,
signifying its ability and desire to work to improve social policy and foster
environmentally friendly economic growth in developing countries.' 95
In considering Chile for accession, OECD recommended that Chile update its
environmental oversight system to reflect a stronger dedication to sustainable
development and heightened judicial enforcement' 96 and to add safeguards to
ensure compliance with domestic environmental regulations.197 In particular,
OECD recommended that Chile "develop and strengthen" its 1) national and
regional environmental institutions; 2) environmental regulatory framework; and
3) compliance and enforcement capacity.'" Chile responded with Ley 20.417.

IV. LEY 20.417's CHANGES

TO THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK COULD LEAD
COURTS AND REGULATORS TO ULTIMATELY REJECT FURTHER PORTIONS OF
THE HIDROAYStN PROJECT

As written, Ley 20.417 makes several changes to the existing regulatory
structure. Most importantly, it creates three centralized bodies to oversee and
enforce environmental law in Chile: a cabinet-level Ministry of the
Environment;' a new national regulator, or "Superintendency" of environmental

ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5km4knxj9tf3.pdfrexpires=1381773678&id=id&accname=guest&che
cksum=E0AC7C285114FA94DB83792C463BDC85; Michel Potier & Cristina Tdbar Less, Trade and
Environment at the OECD: Key Issues Since 1991 (OECD Trade and Environment, Working Paper No.
http://www.oecdat
available
2008),
2008/1,
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5kzcO6m8wds8.pdf?expires=1381773274&id=id&accname=guest&ch
ecksum=257F81194ACF410523F821D6B5AA3156;.
193. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
194. See Sagar, supranote 122, at 944-46 (examining the restructuring in the 1990's); Chile Signs
Up as First OECD Member in South America, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Jan. 11,2010),
http://www.oecd.org/chile/chilesignsupasfirstoecdmemberinsouthamerica.htm (highlighting the changes
brought on upon joining the OECD).
195. See About the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about
(last visited Apr. 4, 2013); Chile Signs Up as First OECD Member in South America, supra note 194.
196. OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supra note 9, at 16-18.
197. Id. at 17. See also Tom Azzopardi, Cleaning Up Environmental Regulation, Bus. CHILE MAG.
(Feb. 25, 2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.businesschile.cl/en/print/news/cronica/cleaning-environmentalregulation.
198. OECD, 2005 CHILE REVIEW, supra note 9, at 17.
199. Law No. 19300, art. 69, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by Law
No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 1163, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
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compliance;2oo and a revamped Environmental Evaluation Service. 2 0' This section
first compares the three new bodies' powers before turning to the ongoing court
battle over the HidroAysdn project. In particular, it asks whether the project would
have survived the permitting process under the revamped system and, more
importantly, whether the upcoming permit process for the transmission line will
survive.
A.

Ley 20.417's Improvements to Chile'sEnvironmentalFramework

This section first discusses the new Ministry of the Environment's powers
under Ley 20.417 to manage the country's environmental framework. It then
discusses the broad superintendency of the Ministry of the Environment's
enforcement powers over individual compliance and oversight over other
government agencies related to environmental issues. Lastly, it discusses the
Environmental Evaluation Service's replacement of CONAMA as the
administrative environmental permitting oversight agency.
1.

Ministry of the Environment's New Powers: Managing the
Country's Environmetnal Framework

The new Ministry of the Environment significantly strengthens Chile's
environmental regulatory landscape, at least on the new law's face. Most
importantly, the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, or
"MMA") consolidates environmental regulatory powers under one sitting cabinet
202
member, replacing CONAMA, a non-cabinet agency.22
This represents a step
forward from the now-defunct CONAMA because it permits the Minister of the
Environment to compel the chief officers of any government wing with a
connection to environmental issues to submit periodic reports on the state of the
environment.2 03 CONAMA, as a mere government agency, played a more
collaborative role with other agencies rather than commanding a ministerial
oversight role, minimizing its ultimate efficacy.204
To further distinguish MMA from CONAMA, Ley 20.417 empowers the
Ministry to work directly with the President to: 1) design and implement policies,
plans, and programs relating to environmental issues; 2) protect and conserve
biological diversity and land and aquatic natural resources; and 3) promote
sustainable development, and the integrity of environmental policy and
regulations.205 In particular, Ley 20.417 permits MMA to develop national
200. Law No. 20417, Articulo Segundo, art. 1, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
201. Law No. 19300, art. 80, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by Law
No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 1163, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
202. Law No. 19300, art. 69, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by Law
No. 20417, Articulo Primero, $63, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
203. Law No. 19300, art. 70(o), Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by
Law No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 1163, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
204. See notes 160-174 and accompanying text.
205. Law No. 19300, art. 69, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by Law
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environmental policies addressing protected areas, international agreements with
environmental components, all natural resources, climate change, and sustainable
development.2 06 The HidroAys6n Project, for example, implicates MMA's
involvement in policy-making because it floods areas protected as national parks,
potentially violates an international water-sharing agreement with Argentina, deals
extensively with water rights, represents an attempt to minimize Chile's carbon
207
footprint, and undermines sustainable development principles.
Furthermore, the law creates the Ministerial Council on Sustainability (el
Consejo de Ministros para la Sustentabilidad), with the Minister of the
Environment presiding. 208 Functionally, the Council on Sustainability achieves
two goals absent from the previous law. First, it recognizes Chile's drive to
incorporate sustainable development initiatives at all levels of government.
Second, it places the Minister of the Environment as the head of a team of
ministers who represent the many facets necessary to achieve a broad-based
sustainable development initiative within the country: the Ministers of Agriculture,
Interior, Public Health, Economics, Energy, Public Works, Urban Planning,
Transportation and Telecommunication, Mining, and Planning all have positions
on the Council.2 09 This is a significant improvement over the old law because it
enables MMA to direct other ministries' activities that fall within the scope of
sustainable development and the environment.
Finally, MMA creates sub-director positions in each of Chile's regions that
answer to the Minister in Santiago.21 By assigning a local official in each region,
this change streamlines communications from regional capitols to Santiago,
ostensibly in order to avoid the confusion and power politics that existed under
CONAMA. 21 1

No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 1 63, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). The original reads
as follows:
Articulo 69.- Crdase el Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, como una Secretaria de Estado
encargada de colaborar con el Presidente de la Rep6blica en el diseio y aplicaci6n de
politica, planes y programas en materia ambiental, asi como en la protecci6n y conservaci6n
de la diversidad biol6gica y de los recurso naturales renovables e hidricos, promoviendo el
desarrollo sustentable, la integridad de la politica ambiental y su regulaci6n normativa.
Law No. 19300, art. 69, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
206. Law No. 19300, art. 70 (b)-(i), Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by
Law No. 20417, Articulo Primero, I63, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
207. See, e.g., Susan Munroe, IlidroAysin Opponents Appeal to Chile's Supreme Court, SANTIAGO
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.santiagotimes.cl/chile/environment/23101-hidroaysen-opponentsappeal-to-chiles-supreme-court.
208. Law No. 19300, art. 71, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by Law
No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 1 63, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
209. Id.
210. Law No. 19300, art. 75, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by Law
No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 1163, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
211. Interview with Professor Tomas Vial Solar, Program Director of Public Law, Universidad
Andres Bello, Santiago, Chile (Jan. 4, 2011).
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Broad Superintendency of the Environment Enforcement Powers
over Individual Compliance and Oversight over Other
Government Agencies Related to Environmental Issues

Arguably, the Superintendency of the Environment (Superintendencia del
Medio Ambiente, or "SMA") is the most important addition to Chile's
environmental regulatory structure. By establishing SMA, Ley 20.417 closes two
major loopholes: first, it gives broad enforcement powers to SMA to police any
environmental permit or other document; second, it empowers SMA to compel
other agencies to carry out SMA's enforcement schemes.212 However, as
explained below, Ley 20.417 does limit SMA's power in certain areas that may
have strong implications for the HidroAysdn Project.
First, although SMA must contract to certified third party professionals the
job of inspecting already-approved projects, it retains full power over enforcement
and supervision of those contractors.213 Additionally, it has the right to request all
the information that the third party gathered or used during its own evaluation of
214
any given project.
This ensures that proposed projects undergo a preliminary
review, but also takes advantage of Chile's burgeoning market resources. By
maximizing government oversight and use of the private sector, SMA will have
more resources free to review data and conclusions regarding the status of a
proposal for a permit.
Second, SMA has the power to suspend any previously authorized permit-or
take any other necessary measures-under two circumstances. In one situation, the
agency may halt a permitted project if it poses a "grave and immediate threat" to
the environment due to the project's noncompliance with the applicable rules and
regulations set forth in its permit. 215 In another situation, it may halt a project if
"unforeseen effects" may lead to grave and immediate danger to the environment,
even if the project's execution does not violate any applicable rules or
regulations. 216
Third, Article 11 bis of Ley 20.417 prohibits potential permit applicants from
knowingly segmenting a project with the purpose of avoiding an environmental
review on sections of their project.217 The SMA determines the severity of the
applicant's avoidance measures and then may require them to rewrite that
application to include the segmented portion of the project.218
However, Article 11 bis goes on to limit SMA's enforcement power when the
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
Law No.
218.

Law No. 20417, Articulo Segundo, art. 2, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
Id. Articulo Segundo, art. 3(c).
Id. Articulo Segundo, art. 3(d)-(e).
Id. Articulo Segundo, art. 3(g).
Id. Articulo Segundo, art. 3(h).
Law No. 19300, art. 11 bis, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by
20417, Articulo Primero, T 9, Enero 12, 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
Id.
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project's proponent argues that it segmented the project because it intended to
develop the project in a series of phases. 219 This paragraph severely restricts SMA
from taking necessary action to protect the environment because it allows project
proponents to split large projects into phases in order to minimize that project's full
impacts. 220 For example, the HidroAysdn Project would not functionally exist
without a transmission line carrying hydroelectric power from Aysdn to the Central
Grid. However, even under the new law, SMA would not have had the statutory
power to require HidroAysdn to evaluate the environmental impact of the
transmission line, because HidroAys6n stated that it intended to develop the dam
project separately from the transmission line from the outset of the project.
Fourth, Ley 20.417 mandates that SMA work in close conjunction with MMA
and other agencies in the Chilean government, in order to develop enforcement
guidelines for the Ley's substantive provisions. 221 These powers simply underline
SMA's role as the Chilean government's centralized environmental enforcement
wing. In order to effectuate SMA's rulemaking power, the Ley provides the
necessary extension of the power to create enforcement guidelines: it also
empowers SMA to "impose sanctions" over anything within its ambit in the Ley. 222
Thus, SMA works closely with MMA and the Environmental Evaluation Service,
discussed infra, to help those two entities carry out the environmental policy and
technical evaluation.
3.

The Environmental Evaluation Service's Replacement of
CONAMA as the Adminstrative Environmental Permitting
Oversight Agency

Under Ley 20.417, the Environmental Evaluation Service (Servicio de
Evaluaci6nAmbiental, or "SEA") takes on the role formerly occupied by the nowdefunct CONAMA to oversee and manage the administrative permitting process.
Ley 20.417 concentrates the administrative permitting function under an Executive
Director of SEA, who answers directly to the Minister of the Environment. 223 Like
CONAMA, SEA has a regional presence that approves or rejects proposed
224
projects.

219. Id.
220. Id. This stands in contrast to another OECD member, the United States, where such
segmentation would violate the purpose of its National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1985). Major U.S. federal actions affecting the
quality of the environment must account for the cumulative impacts of inherently connected actions. Id.
Thus, the transmission line project likely would have been subject to NEPA permitting review
concurrently with the dam proposal if this dam were sited in the United States rather than Chile.
221. Law No. 20417, Articulo Segundo, art. 3(q)-(v), Enero 12, 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile).
222. Id. Articulo Segundo, art. 3(o).
223. Law No. 19300, art. 80, 82, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by
Law No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 1163, Enero 12, 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
224. CONAMA's regional bodies were known as the Regional Environmental Commission
(Comisi6n Regional del Medio Ambiente, or "COREMA"). See discussion supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
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However, Ley 20.417 replaces COREMA with the Regional Environmental
Evaluation Commission, (Direcci6n Regionales de Evaluacidn Ambiental, or
"Regional Commission") presided over by the regional sub-Minister for the
Environment and including the regional director of the Environmental Evaluation
Service, as well as any other ministerial director that has a connection with
environmental issues.225 The Regional Commission will evaluate each project.226
At that point a separate commission-presided over jointly by the regional
Intendente (or Governor) and regional sub-Director of SEA and including the
regional sub-Ministers of the Environment, Agriculture, Interior, Public Health,
Economics, Energy, Public Works, Urban Planning, Transportation and
Telecommunication, Mining, and Planning-will ultimately approve or reject the
project.227 It remains to be seen whether this two-step evaluation and approval
process will have an alleviatory effect by subjecting project proposals to stricter
scrutiny. At the least, requiring a cross-sectoral commission to make the final
decision will ensure that projects incorporate important environmental, public
health, community development, and human rights considerations into their impact
analyses.
In summary, the Regional Commission plays functionally the same role as
COREMA, but has a stronger infrastructure supporting its decisions and answers to
a cabinet ministry rather than a wholly decentralized administrative agency.
Because the Regional Commission must follow the Minister of the Environment's
policy and can, in turn, rely on the Minister to support its decisions, the Regional
Commission represents an improvement over its predecessor.
B.

Would the Chilean Courts' HidroAysen Decisions Reach a Different
Outcome if Ley 20.417 Were Applicable to the Project'sGenerationand
Transmission Components?

This section attempts to determine whether the Chilean Courts' HidroAysdn
Project decisions would be different if Ley 20.417 were applicable to the Project's
generation and transmission components.
1.

Puerto Montt Appellate Court's Reliance on the Superseded
LSBMA to Uphold Approval of the HidroAysen Project

On October 6, 2011, the Appellate Court in Puerto Montt-by a 2-1 vote with
a powerful dissent-determined that the now-defunct CONAMA did not abuse its
discretion by approving the HidroAysdn project.228 Opponents of HidroAysdn

225. Law No. 19300, art. 86, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), as amended by Law
No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 63, Enero 12, 20101, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Apelaciones, Kiss, Antonio Horvath c. Comisidn de Evaluaci6n Ambiental de la Region de
Aysen, supra note 12, at 147-59.
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challenged the EIA to the Chilean Supreme Court, 229 and on April 4, 2012, the
Chilean Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, and rejected all appeals in a 3-2
vote. 230 In brief, the Appellate Court first determined that it would rely on the
now-superseded LSBMA. 23 1 Proceeding from that starting point, it reviewed and
rejected the appellants' seven challenges to the approval, which include: 1)
procedural violations by COREMA when it initially reviewed the HidroAys6n
project's EIA; 2) an inadequate mitigation plan for the endangered huemul, a small
Patagonia deer species; 3) COREMA's blatant disregard for Chile's national law
and its accession to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"); 4) a violation of the Chilean Constitution; 5)
illegal segmentation of the project into a separate transmission and dam projects;
6) arbitrarily reduced public participation; and 7) failure to consider the social and
environmental impact wrought by an influx of temporary workers into the Ays6n
region.2 32 Ley 20.417 did not factor into the Supreme Court's decision, as the
Appellate Court made the determination to rely on LSBMA.
The Appellate Court applied a deferential standard of review on COREMA's
approval, determining that it was neither "capricious, irrational, illogical, nor
lacking in reason."233 The Court's reasoning also outlined the State's duty in
balancing economic development and environmental protection:
Economic development always entails some level of alteration to the
environment, and it is the duty of the State to guarantee that such
intervention does not produce harmful side effects to people and other

living things [in the area of development]; this duty is carried out
precisely through the process of environmental evaluation, much as was

done here. 234

229. Anna Pope, Chile s HidroAysin Project Gets Green Light by Local Appeals Court, SANTIAGO
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.santiagotimes.cl/chile/environment/22624-chiles-hidroaysen-projectgets-green-light-by-local-appeals-court.
230. David Pedigo, Chilean Supreme Court Approves HidroAysen Project, SANTIAGO TIMES (Apr.
5,
2012),
http://www.santiagotimes.cl/chile/human-rights-a-law/23665-chilean-supreme-courtapproves-hidroaysen-project.
231. Apelaciones, Kiss, Antonio Horvath c. Comisidn de Evaluacion Ambiental de la Region de
Aysin, supranote 12, at 127.
232. See id. at 147-48. For a synopsis of the appellants' arguments in English, written by
appellants' partners, see Amanda Maxwell, Appeals Court Rules in Favor of HidroAysin-And Sends
Our Case to Chile 's Supreme Court, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amaxwell/appeals-court rules-infavor-o.html.
233. Apelaciones, Kiss, Antonio Horvath c. Comisi6n de Evaluacidn Ambiental de la Region de
Aysin, supra note 12, at 146 ("[N]o aparece caprichoso, irracional, il6gico ni carente de razonabilidad .
234. Id. at 140-41 (emphasis added). Translated from Spanish by the authors. The original reads:
El desarrollo de la vida siempre conlleva algin nivel de alteraci6n del medio ambiente y es
deber del Estado garantizar que esa intervenci6n no produzca efectos dafiinos para las
personas y demis seres vivientes que alli habiten, y esto debe hacerse precisamente a travds
de un procedimiento de evaluaci6n ambiental, como es el que ha realizado la Comisi6n
recurrida.
Id.
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Although the Court speaks in absolute terms-the State must guarantee that
economic development does not harm people and the environment-it assumes
that the State may consider its duty fulfilled simply by approving a project, even if
that project will admittedly harm the environment. The Appellate Court explained
that the agency's procedural duties are satisfied as long as an "approval is preceded
by a rigorous evaluation by the environmental authority" and the project "is
executed under certain conditions and requirements" that strive to protect existing
natural resources for the national benefit. 235 Thus, held the Appellate Court, under
LSBMA, a project could be approved as long as the state agency positively
reviews the proposal.
2.

The Chilean Supreme Court's Majority Decision to Interpret
LSBMA Narrowly in Upholing the Puerto Montt Appellate
Court's Ruling

On April 4, 2012 the Supreme Court, in a 3-2 opinion, affirmed the Appellate
Court's opinion. 236 Two judges voiced strong dissents to highlight flaws in the
majority's rationale, particularly its narrow construction of LSBMA's language
that ultimately provided the basis for upholding the Appellate Court.2 37 At the
outset, the Supreme Court refuted the appellants' procedural arguments. First, Ley
20.417's passage nullified COREMA's authority, thus invalidating certain agency
requests, including final approval of the project. 238 The Court held that it does not
constitute an illegal or arbitrary exercise of agency authority, nullify the final
agency decision, or conflict with any constitutional guarantee when said agency
makes a request to a project proponent on a pending issue after a new law has
already withdrawn that agency's authority. 239 Furthermore, because Ley 20.417
established the MMA and SEA as the natural successors to CONAMA, and

235. Id. at 138. Translated from Spanish by the authors. The original reads: "[L]o que se exige es
que la calificaci6n favorable de dichos proyectos sea precedida de una rigurosa evaluaci6n por la
autoridad ambiental a fin de que s6lo pueda ejecutarse bajo ciertas condiciones y exigencias en defensa
del uso nacional de los recursos naturales existentes." Id.
236. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 4 abril 2012, "Kiss, Antonio Horvath c.
Comisi6n Ambiental de la Region de Ays6n," Rol de la causa: 10.220-2011, protecci6n, p. 24-25
(Chile), available at http://suprema.podeijudicial.cl/SITSUPPORWEB (click "Ingresar" from the
"Corte de Origen" box and input "10220-2011" into the text box for Rol Ingreso and click "Consulta";
follow "10220-2011" hyperlink to access docket; follow "27235" folio hyperlink to access document)
[hereinafter Corte Suprema de Justicia, Kiss, Antonio Horvath c. Comisidn Ambiental de la Region de
Aysen].
237. Id. at 25, 36.
238. Id. at 3-4.
239. Id. at 5. Translated by the authors. The original reads:
"[S]in embargo ... cuando dicho 6rgano ya debia haber cesado en su ejercicio, no conlleva
una ilegalidad o arbitrariedad de la actuaci6n ni menos conduce a dejar sin efecto la
resoluci6n final, por cuanto la conducta de dicha comisi6n s6lo tuvo por finalidad dar curso a
la evaluaci6n del proyecto que se encontraba pendiente y ello no conculca garantia
constitucional alguna."
Id.
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established the Regional Commission as the agency in charge of project approval,
the "project has been approved by the agency that is empowered to do so under the
new legal framework." 2 40
Second, the Supreme Court concluded that the agency adequately considered
the appellants' public comments even though the agency failed to publish its
responses to the comments until it ultimately presented the addenda to the permit.
The Court held that the fact that appellants successfully submitted thousands of
comments, "demonstrates that the community has been heard and, as a
consequence, [the agency] has complied with the principles" of citizen
participation. 24 1 In other words, merely opening the door to public comment
satisfies procedural due process.
The Court next criticized the appellants for attempting to stop the project by
asking the court to enjoin the implementation of the approved project by issuing a
recurso de proteccidn. The Chilean Constitution defines recurso de proteccidn as
injunctive relief, it specifically permits a party to request a recurso deproteccidn if
the party believes that arbitrary or unlawful agency action has infringed on her
constitutional right to live in a contamination-free environment.2 42 In this case, the
Supreme Court said that the appellants waited until June 2011 -nearly two years
from the date of injury-to present their request for an injunction, demonstrating a
lack of urgency. 24 3 However, the Court failed to mention that the project
ultimately was not approved until May 2011.
After striking down the appellants' procedural complaints, the Court
evaluated the appellants' substantive arguments: that the agency permitted the
project despite HidroAysen's failure to adequately explain and mitigate impacts to
National Park Laguna San Rafael; to species of concern, including the huemul
deer; and to human settlements and life.
Appellants began by arguing that the agency did not assess the project's plan
to flood portions of Laguna San Rafael. The Court responded that the LSBMA
only required the agency to determine that the activity requested is lawful and does
not contravene any judicial order.244 Additionally, the Court rejected the
appellants' argument that CITES forbids altering a national park unless a law
specifically authorizes it. Instead, the Court held that Article 60 of the Chilean
Constitution, which establishes the subject matter of laws, remains silent as to
whether a new law is required in order to alter a national park boundary. So, an
agency action altering the park boundary does not violate the law. 2 45 The
240. Id. at 6-7. Translated by the authors. The original reads: "[Q]ue el proyecto haya sido
calificado por el organismo al que en la actualidad le corresponde hacerlo bajo el imperio de la nueva
normativa . . . ." Id.
241. Id. at 9. Translated by the authors. The original reads: "Ello demuestra que la comunidad si ha
sido oida y, en consecuencia, cumplidos los principios antes enunciados." Id.
242. CONSTITUCION POLiTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 20.

243. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Kiss, Antonio Horvath c. Comisi6n Ambiental de la Region de
Aysin, supra note 236, at 7-8.
244. Id. at 9-10.
245. Id. at 10-12.
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appellants also argued the project approval was inappropriate because the agency
did not require HidroAysin to conduct an environmental impact study to determine
the project's impact to the endangered huemul deer's habitat before approving the
project. Instead, the agency approved the project on the basis that HidroAysin
promised to undertake a study that would contribute to increased knowledge about
the Patagonian deer population and habitat.246
Finally, the Court refused to rule on whether HidroAys6n impermissibly
segmented the project into a generation project and transmission project.
According to the Court's interpretation of LSBMA, segmentation is impermissible
only if the project proponent knowingly segments a project with the intent to avoid
having to submit it to the SEIA process.247 Because HidroAys6n still had to submit
the project for environmental review, the Court determined that it had not violated
LSBMA's segmentation rule.
The dissent, in a barbed response to the majority's conclusion, castigated
COREMA, as well as the majority, for failing to comply with Article 12(d) and (e)
of LSBMA, which requires a comprehensive environmental impact study to weigh
the risks of the project and adopt clear, specific, and effective mitigation or
compensation measures.2 48 Its inadequate review of the project infringed on the
appellants'
constitutionally
protected rights to a contamination-free
environment. 249 Citing the Presidential Decree accompanying LSBMA, the dissent
highlighted the agency's obligation to determine all the environmental impacts in
order to make a fully informed decision to approve, mitigate, or reject the project
proposal.250 Since the agency had failed to carry out its duty, the Court should
overturn the Appellate Court's ruling and grant an injunction in favor of the
appellants.
As to flooding in Laguna San Rafael, the dissent found that HidroAys6n had
avoided its duty by passing the valuation of and compensation for the impacts of
flooding to a third party. That key information, according to the dissent, formed a
critical part of HidroAysdn's impact study; without an exact accounting of that
impact, the project should not move forward.25 1 With respect to HidroAys6n's
proposed huemul study, the dissent aptly asserted that, under LSBMA Article
12(d) and (e), the environmental impact study must occur before project approval
because its conclusions help the COREMA determine whether to approve or reject
the proposed project.2 52 By approving the project without requiring HidroAys6n to
undertake the huemul study beforehand, COREMA acted arbitrarily.

246.
247.
248.
249.
19(8)).
250.
251.

Id. at 13-15.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 27, 34 (Araneda, M., dissenting).
Id. at 35-36 (citing CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPJBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] arts. 19(1),
Id. at 25-31.
Id. at 29-31.

252. Id. at 26-27.

2013

THE HIDROAYSEN NORTHERN PATAGONIA DAMS MEGAPROJECT

549

Finally, the dissent went further than the majority by discussing how
HidroAys6n inadequately evaluated potential impacts to human health and safety.
In particular, it found that the company did not assess the impacts of a
phenomenon known as "glacial lake outburst floods", or GLOFs, which occur
regularly in the region and drastically change the flow volume in the Baker and
Pascua Rivers. 253 The dissent again concluded that LSBMA Article 12(d) and (e)
required an adequate evaluation of adverse impacts.
3.

Chilean Judicial Application of Ley 20.417 to the HidroAys6n
Project: Likely Reversal of the CONAMA Approval Decision and
Possible Rejection of the Project's Transmission Component?

In order to gauge how the new Ministry of the Environment and its subagencies should react to future proposals for hydroelectric development, this article
assesses the relevant issues from the Appellate and Supreme Courts' decision
Most importantly, because HidroAys6n
through the lens of Ley 20.417.
purposefully did not prepare an EIA for the transmission line connecting the dam
to the Central Grid, the proposal for the transmission line will be evaluated under
Ley 20.417's new framework. This section will thus outline how a court should
apply the analysis of the pertinent issues to a hypothetical transmission line
proposal scenario.
First, Ley 20.417 prohibits segmentation of projects-unless the proponent
intends to develop the project in stages.254 Thus, the new framework still permits
segmentation as long as the proponent says it intended to stage the project's
development. Nevertheless, HidroAys6n's decision to segment the project will
have powerful ramifications because it must now submit the transmission line
proposal to the new regulatory framework.
Second, Ley 20.417 includes an extra protection against premature or
improper procedural decisions. The regional sub-Minister of the Environment
must actively evaluate each project within the constraints of her mandate by
determining whether the project promotes sustainable development, protects
biodiversity and Chile's natural heritage, and aligns with MMA's policy
objectives. 255 If the project survives that review, the regional sub-director of the
SEA must still work with various sub-ministers to approve or reject it in line with
the sub-director's mandate from the MMA.256 While it does not negate the
possibility that a flawed proposal will still survive review, adding a layer of
oversight from the cabinet will insure against local bias in the decision-making
process. It will also allow a high-level official to scrutinize projects for
compliance with the framework law. HidroAys6n has not submitted its proposal

253. Id. at 31-34. See also Burrall et al., supra note 85 (providing an in-depth analysis of GLOF
events in Patagonia).
254. Law No. 19300, art. 11 bis, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), amended by Law
No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 119, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
255. See supra notes 202-211 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 223-227 and accompanying text.
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for the transmission line yet, but this additional procedural oversight function will
ensure that a cabinet-level minister and her advisors will supervise the review of
each proposal, strengthening the procedural process.
Third, MMA's organic statute requires it to protect biological diversity in its
decision-making process. 257 Because MMA must assess proposed permits, it
follows that MMA should have to reject or require protective measures when a
proposal will result in significant loss of biodiversity. Under the new law, the
MMA will have to carefully scrutinize the HidroAysdn dam project's impact on
the huemul deer. If the Ministry fails to carry out an adequate analysis of the
impacts on biological diversity, it would violate its own organic statute.
Because the transmission line will cause large-scale land use changes across a
1,500-mile swath of Chile, MMA must consider whether the line will disrupt
migration corridors for endangered species or threaten endangered tree species
where it passes through sensitive landscapes such as Parque Nacional Pumalin and
Parque Nacional Alerce Andino, two areas with high levels of biological diversity
and sensitive flora (the alerce tree only grows in this narrow region of the world)
and fauna (puma, condors, huemul deer, and other threatened species). Because
the transmission line will have an impact, MMA will have to determine whether it
can legally justify permitting a clear-cutting project that jeopardizes biological
diversity.
Fourth, Ley 20.417 requires MMA to interpret and uphold domestic and
international laws dealing with the environment.258 Arguably HidroAysdn's
project will violate a bilateral agreement with Argentina that prohibits either
country from taking unilateral actions that may cause environmental degradation in
the other country. 259 The reservoir will change flow patterns in Lago General
Carrera (known in Argentina as Lago Buenos Aires) and has the potential to
adversely impact Argentina's water quality.
Appellants also argued that Chile contravened CITES and the Convention on
Biological Diversity ("CBD") by condoning this action. HidroAysin's plan will
flood a portion of National Park Laguna San Rafael, a protected area with high
biological diversity that appellants said merited protection under both agreements.
Although the Appellate Court rejected the environmental appellants' argument in
this respect, Ley 20.417 explicitly instructs MMA to make and interpret policy
relating to international environmental agreements and to protect biological
diversity. 260 If MMA had existed at the time HidroAys6n submitted the
application, the Ministry's organic statute would have obligated MMA to require

257. Law No. 19300, art. 69, Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIo OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), amended by Law No.
20417, Articulo Primero, 1 63, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
258. Law No. 19300, art. 70, Marzo 1, 1994, DiARio OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), amended by Law No.
20417, Articulo Primero, 1163, Enero 12, 2011, DiARiO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
259. Treaty on the Environment art. 1, Arg.-Chile, Aug. 2, 1991, 1733 U.N.T.S. 201.
260. Law No. 19300, arts. 69, 70(d), Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), amended by
Law No. 20417, Articulo Primero, 63, Enero 12, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).

2013

THE HIDROAYslN NORTHERN PATAGONIA DAMS MEGAPROJECT

551

the company to alter its plans.
Similarly, because the transmission line currently will pass through a number
of protected areas in Chile-geographically it must pass through at least one
national park because Parque Nacional Pumalin stretches the width of the country
from the ocean to the Argentinian border 26 1-the MMA will have to take its
organic statute into account when assessing the transmission project. Specifically,
MMA will have to ask whether it can justify a project that will place Chile in the
position of violating international environmental agreements to which the country
has acceded.
Fifth, Ley 20.417 exhorts SMA to halt or reject any project under the "grave
and immediate danger to the environment" standard.262 This broad standard allows
SMA to exercise significant discretion over proposed projects if it believes that
grave or immediate danger may result. For example, as evidenced above, the
HidroAys6n project certainly poses an immediate danger to Chile's national parks
and its endangered huemules,2 63 which could trigger this provision. In addition, the
project arguably fails to account for the socio-environmental impacts of temporary
workers in the Aysen region, which also could trigger this provision. HidroAysdn
estimates that it will require an average 2,260 workers over the 11-year
construction period, with a high-water mark of 5,100 workers.264 The town of
Cochrane, just downstream from the damsites, will see a large percentage of these
workers.265 Cochrane currently has only 2,800 inhabitants,266 meaning that the
HidroAysin project will more than double the town's size and its infrastructural
requirements in the span of a decade.
More importantly, the "grave and immediate danger" standard may also
implicate climate change impacts that the dam will produce. Because the MMA
must make policies related to climate change,267 and SMA must carry out MMA's
policy goals, under Ley 20.417 SMA would have to account for the HidroAysdn
project's carbon footprint. The recent MIT study found that the land use changes
from the dam project alone will release nearly 2.5 million tons of carbon dioxide
("C02") emissions.268 Although the dam project will emit less than ten percent of

261. See
Parque
Pumalin,
PARQUE
PUMALIN
(Chile),
http://www.parquepumalin.cl/content/download/mapapumalin.pdf (last visited April 16, 2013).
262. Law No. 20417, Articulo Segundo, art. 3(g), (h), 12 Enero, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile).
263. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
264. See Apelaciones, Kiss, Antonio Horvath c. Comisidn de Evaluacidn Ambiental de la Region de
Aysin, supra note 12, at 104.
265. See id.
266. Cochrane,
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http://www.ine.cl/canales/chile estadistico/censospoblacion vivienda/censo2002/mapa interactivo/m
apainteractivo.htm (follow "Regi6n Ays6n del General Carlos lbafiez del Campo" hyperlink; then
follow "Cochrane" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
267. Law No. 19300, art. 70(h), Marzo 1, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), amended by Law
No. 20417, Art. Primero 63, Enero 12, 2010, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile).
268. See Burrall et al., supranote 85, at 15.
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the C02 of a natural gas plant of similar energy production scale, 269 recent studies
indicate that large-scale dams have a greater and more lasting impact on global
carbon emissions. 270 The World Commission on Dams suggests that large, shallow
hydroelectric reservoirs-such as the HidroAysdn reservoirs-may emit as many
greenhouse gases per kilowatt-hour as thermal power plants.271 It also warns that
destroying boreal forests-such as the one in southern Chile-would disturb one
of the world's most important terrestrial carbon sinks. 272
The SMA must take the "grave and immediate danger" standard into account
when analyzing the transmission line proposal because of the possibility of
environmental impact and because of the numerous potentially grave impacts that
HidroAysdn has thus far overlooked. According to the MIT study, land use
changes for the transmission line will add another 8.1 million tons of C02 into the
atmosphere.273 It will also disrupt nearly 11,000 hectares (approximately 27,100
acres) of land.274 As detailed above, it also has the potential to disrupt migration
corridors and impact nationally protected areas in Chile.275 Moreover, due to the
seismic uncertainty of the region through which it will pass, 276 the transmission
line has the potential to rupture and cause grave, yet unforeseen, impacts to the
region. The SMA has the responsibility under its organic statute to anticipate those
unforeseen impacts in determining whether it should approve the project.
Another consideration regarding the HidroAys6n transmission line is funding.
As described in Part II, Chile has a strong free-market philosophical commitment,
so government funding does not figure prominently. Thus far the Chilean
government has been reluctant to pledge any public funding for the project.277 The
private international finance market may not prove eager to lend for entirely
different philosophical reasons: many banks and financial institutions have adopted
the Equator Principles, a set of principles adopted by financial institutions and
applied to public finance transactions exceeding USD $10 million in capital
costs.278 Under the Equator Principles, a participating financial institution commits
to not providing loans to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to

269. Id. at 14.
270. See WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, supra note 84, at 75-77. See also GRANDES REPRESAS EN
AMERICA, supra note 84, at 19.
271. See WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, supra note 84, at 77.

272. Id. at 75-76.
273. See Burrall et al., supra note 85, at 15.
274. Id. at 5.
275. See Letter from Juan Pablo Orrego S., supra note 81; see also supra notes 257-261 and
accompanying text.
276. See FIERRO, supra note 4, at 15-16.
277. Graciela Ibanez, Chile Government Rules Out Buying Stake in Hidroaysen Power Project,4TRADERS (June 1, 2012, 11:33AM), http://www.4-traders.com/COLBUN-SA-6494571/news/ChileGovemment-Rules-Out-Buying-Stake-In-HidroAysen-Power-Project-14353974.
278. Public finance is often used to fund the development and construction of major infrastructure
and industrial projects. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equatorprinciples.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
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comply with the bank's respective social and environmental policies and
procedures.279 Already, the Spanish bank BBVA has cited the Equator Principles
as an insurmountable barrier to funding the HidroAys6n project.280
V.

CONCLUSION

At press, the transmission line that will carry hydroelectric power from the
dam project to the Central Grid has not yet been submitted to SEA for approval.
HidroAys6n has delayed submission, supposedly in order to draft a more airtight
proposal. 2 8' There are also rumors that economically the project is dead because of
project funding problems associated with the Equator Principles and legal
uncertainties arising from the new Ley 20.417 application to the transmission part
of the project. Since HidroAys6n decided not to include the transmission line in its
original proposal, if the project continues, the transmission line project will be
subject to the new Ley 20.417 instead of the older LSBMA. Many locals believe
that an approved HidroAys6n permit will make the transmission line a foregone
282
However, several obstacles may quash the HidroAys6n project
conclusion.
before the company pours any concrete. First, the SEA will have to assess the
proposed transmission line under more stringent substantive rules than those that
existed when HidroAys6n and ENDESA submitted the dam project for approval.
Second, Chile's recent accession to OECD may provide a strong incentive for the
country's new environmental ministry to exercise its authority by determining that
the transmission line project poses too many social and environmental risks to be
approved. If any of these factors dissuade the company from proceeding, it will
both demonstrate Ley 20.417's enactment and establish that the heightened
regulatory framework required as a prerequisite to OECD membership made a
strong impact on Chile's environmental institutions. It will also demonstrate that
Chile's new environmental laws are alive, well, and even thriving in how they
require adherence to developed, rather than developing, country environmental
standards applicable to large scale energy and other infrastructure projects.
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